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Abstract: This research starts to unravel the nomological network of a funding climate 
and defines the regulatory state and efficacy level of the CEO – COO dyad needed to 
increase firm performance.  Funding climate is further validated by this research 
exposing the impact a funding climate may have prior, during and after a company 
receives funding. Top management team’s (CEO – COO dyad) shared regulatory focus 
both promotion and prevention may have a relationship to firm performance via group 
collective efficacy.  This research provides the opportunity to contribute to social-
cognitive theory linking collective efficacy with firm performance.  This study will lend 
to practitioners decision-making on both sides of the funding cycle.  Most business 
inevitably require funding, initiating a funding climate, through the funding agency lens 
the knowledge gained through this study will contribute in empowering them to make a 
decision on what CEO-COO dyad possibly fit their business.  The data collected for this 
study utilized a web-based surveys program.  Over 50 dyads participated and their results 
were aggregated with firm performance confirmed by the CFO or a ranking financial 
official of the company.  Catalysts for creating value in an organization are vast; two 
variables that appear to be required to solidify any value horizon are tested in this 
research. Prevention focused top management teams collective efficacy was shown to 
have a significant positive relationship with firm performance. Promotion focused 
management teams revealed a significant positive relationship to collective efficacy. 
Possible more importantly is the confirmation of the significant and positive conditional 
indirect effects of dyad promotion focus on collective efficacy with Sit & Wait Funding 
Climate as a moderator.     
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Catalysts for creating value in an organization have been postulated to be competitors, 
ownership structure (public versus private), technology, management team, and a host of other 
variables that can be attributed to performance and success (Payne, Davis, Moore, & Bell, 2009; 
Petty & Gruber, 2011; Rajan, 2010; Robinson, 2009; Sweeting, 1991). There are, however, two 
variables that appear to be required to solidify any value horizon—one is capital, and the other is 
a functional top management team. These are core for most organizations, and without either of 
them, the organization may struggle in sustaining value.    
Top management teams contribute to the success of an organization when the group has a 
common vision and strategy (Carmeli, Sheaffer, & Halevi, 2009).  Capital can become a key 
component for structuring a successful organization; gaining access to capital is an essential 
obligation for the top management team.  The top management team has to demonstrate to the 
funding agency the impact of the invested capital on the future value. For this dissertation, the top 
management team consisted of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Operations 
Officer (COO) characterized here forthwith as CEO-COO Dyad (CCD). During a funding event 
(in search of or receiving capital), the primary focus for the CEO is the funding agency; the 
sustainability of the existing business will be the responsibility of the second half of the dyad,
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the COO.  
The business environment surrounding CEO can create significant task demands, 
increasing the need to split tasks, and situations and industries that are exceedingly dynamic may 
induce the demand for a COO to allow the CEO to focus on external issues (Hambrick & 
Cannella, 2004). In various studies, the CEO and the COO are considered partners, thought of as 
co-leaders who work closely in their positions (Zhang, 2006).  The CCD is formed by individuals 
with varied traditions, characteristics, and principles that make it difficult to align them into 
functional groups that produce sustained growth.  These complications may induce urgency and 
create a demand for increased diligence to fully understand CCD cogitation and interaction 
during a funding event.  Group members seem to develop affiliated behavior driven partially by 
the situation, depending on the shifting of individual regulatory focus (Sassenberg & Woltin, 
2009).  Creating a functional group can be described as the conjoining of views on the meaning of 
procedures, practices, and policies that form the individual’s day-to-day experience and his or her 
reaction to rewards coinciding with the expectations of how the group is supported (Schneider, 
Ehrhart, & Macey, 2013).   
Both top management teams and capital have diverse impact on organizations. Capital 
can be considered the economic growth stimulus that led the United States out of one economic 
slump after another (Narayan & Narayan, 2013; Solow, 2004). Research has demonstrated that 
increased investment in plants, technologies, and production facilities had an advancing effect on 
the United States’ economic recovery and growth, an effect achieved through public and private 
investment (Solow, 2004).  When an organization is a start-up, in a re-finance phase, or likely to 
be sold (change of control), the requirement for capital is inescapable. When a company 
approaches this threshold and capital is required, it will trigger a funding event, and the 
organization’s unique situation will determine the type of funding agency to be used. Perhaps 
more significant than the capital itself is the fit between the funding agency (holder of the capital) 
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and the CCD, as it will have to manage firm performance emerging out of this fit. The CCD 
needs to pay attention to the expertise of the funding agency in early stage ventures to ensure a 
better fit (Dimov, Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 2007). Each type of funding agency has a unique and 
distinguishable way of approaching funding events; through the eyes of CCDs, they became a 
shared perception akin to climate. In recent research drawing from the tenets of behavioral 
ecology theories of foraging and predator behavior, Wallace, Jordon, Dyer, and Cleveland (2013) 
have constructed an ecology-based taxonomy following predatory styles to describe the funding 
climate.    
On the organization side (the receiver of the capital), two constructs that can help 
cultivate an understanding of the climate are group efficacy and group regulatory focus theory.  
Group efficacy is defined as the shared belief a group of individuals has in its ability to coordinate 
and organize objectives in a conjoined manner as each specific situation arises (Bandura, 1989, 
1997).  Regulatory focus consists of two distinct motivational orientations—promotion and 
prevention—and each uniquely influences goal setting, strategy planning, and execution 
(Higgins, 1997). Group regulatory focus theory posits how groups develop their shared 
perspective on risk (promotion) versus conservatism (prevention; Levine, Higgins, & Choi, 
2000).  Group efficacy and group regulatory focus theories have garnered a considerable amount 
of attention. However, little to no literature examines the relationship between these two 
constructs and how they affect value creation for an organization. Further, no study I am aware of 
has accounted for the relationship of the CCD’s collective view during a funding event and the fit 
with the funding agency. These gaps have created an opportunity to answer these guiding 
questions: What effect does the funding climate have on a group’s regulatory focus via group 
efficacy on firm performance?  Could a better understanding of this relationship assist in 
developing a model for optimizing the fit between the funding agency and CCD’s regulatory 
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focus to increase the opportunity for the organization’s success during and following a funding 
event?  
This dissertation was designed on the contention that group efficacy mediates the 
relationships between regulatory foci of promotion and prevention on firm performance. Further, 
and more importantly, funding climate operates as a key contextual influence on the mediated 
paths from promotion and prevention of firm performance via group efficacy. This moderated-
mediated model will help identify a more optimal fit between the firms’ focus and the funding 
style of a funding agency, ideally resulting in more venture success through firm performance and 
fewer failed funding transitions. See Figure 1 for a description of this study’s structure and 
theoretical model. 
  
 
Figure 1. Theoretical model. Hypotheses 6 and 7 are not depicted but are moderated-mediated 
models.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
In this chapter, I review the core constructs of my dissertation: Firm Performance, CCD 
Efficacy, Promotion and Prevention Foci, and Funding Climate. The four constructs are reviewed 
at an organization level, staying within the business domain. However, given the newness of 
Funding Climate, I utilize the tenets of behavioral ecology and foraging theory from which 
Funding Climate is based. I begin with Firm Performance.  
Firm Performance 
Firm performance incorporates three types of performance: (a) financial performance 
(e.g., return on assets, return on sales, sales growth, and overall financial performance), (b) 
stakeholder performance (e.g., stability/ growth of employment, employee morale/job 
satisfaction, customer relations, supplier relations, overall nonfinancial performance), and (c) 
heterogeneity with regard to resource allocation strategies (e.g., funds allocated to R&D, funds 
allocated to advertising, process innovation, product innovation, and compensation to employees; 
Wallace, Little, Hill, & Ridge, 2010). A firm’s ranking among similar firms is also a gauge of 
firm performance.  Concurring as stated above, measures such as sales growth, net income, net 
return on sales, and net return on assets all are lead indicators to how well the firm is performing 
(Priem, Rasheed, & Kotulic, 1995). 
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Additionally, a second common measure used in a funding context is value creation, 
which can be seen as a proxy to firm performance. Value creation is a generalized term used in 
some financial and funding agency literature and is defined as the result of any elements or 
initiatives that improve the organization (Amit, & Zott, 2001). A reduction of business risk 
through an antidotal lens may reduce CCD risk abhorrence, thus encouraging value creation 
(Humphery-Jenner, 2011). The need for value creation is consistent in all businesses, and one of 
the most common measurements of value is through financial performance (e.g., how the stock 
market rewards a company for reliable financial performance with an increase in stock price). 
Value creation is not left to the public markets, and a recent study by Ernst & Young had the 
private equity market outpacing public markets (Rajan, 2010).  Private equity refers to an 
intermediary financial medium; accordingly, it takes sponsors’ capital and acquires privately held 
companies with the intention of building a portfolio of companies, differentiating from a public 
company due to the illiquidity (Metrick, & Yasuda, 2011). The Ernst & Young study indicated 
that enterprise value was 2 times that of the public rival and earnings before income tax and 
depreciation and amortization grew 33% faster (Rajan, 2010).   
Value creation is not only about the funding agency finding the right company; it is also 
about working closely with the CCD to align expectations of what creates value for both the 
parties (Rajan, 2010).  Value can be created in part due to the reputation of the funding agency:  
Less underpricing occurs for an IPO with a more reputable funding agency, as it tends to stay 
involved with the company even after the IPO (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011).  Value creation in a 
funding context supports firm performance that is influenced by the CCD. The combined tacit 
knowledge of CCD advances the decision-making and strategy capabilities of the group, 
effectively allowing for expansion and knowledge transfer that has a positive direct relationship 
to firm performance (Butler, Perryman, & Ranft, 2012).  CCD’s effective strategic decisions will 
increase with a high level of participative decision-making, which enhances firm performance 
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(Carmeli et al., 2009).  An effective CCD can escalate firm performance, hence supplementing in 
value creation. Amit and Zott (2001) defined value creation as the result of elements or initiatives 
that improve the organization.  
Private equity (funding agencies) literature claims that value creation can be accelerated 
through increasing managerial incentives (Leslie & Oyer, 2008; Rogers, Holland, & Haas, 2002). 
Funding agencies offer decentralized management and a strong incentive plan structured around 
management ownership as a way to increase firm performance (Metrick, & Yasuda, 2011). Leslie 
and Oyer (2008) contended that the CCD’s ownership in most cases increases more in the private 
sector. CCDs may be vital to value creation; the CCD’s role is to sustain the company’s 
competitive advantage (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005). CCD can be defined by how it 
is differentiated from other management teams in the company; typically, it will have 
responsibilities as an executive and as a member of the executive team, significantly increasing 
its accountability as crucial to the decision-making process and strategic expansion (Hambrick, 
1984).  
Hsu, Haynie, Simmons, and McKelvie (2013) found consistency in importance of the 
funding agency’s place in the CCD’s track record, management skills, and characteristics in 
delivering value. Management characteristics such as staying power and the CCD’s familiarity 
with its market seem to dominate the decision to invest, according to a sample consisting of a 
wide variation of specific, quantitative, investment criteria set by the funding agency (Hisrich & 
Jankowicz, 1990). Funding agencies prefer to select a CCD and decent financials along with 
product-market characteristics to increase their likelihood of success, as opposed to the 
prospective company meeting overall fund requirements and deal specifics (Muzyka, Birley, &  
Leleux, 1996). Logically, without a suitable management team and a solid vision, strong 
financials become insignificant, as the business may become unsustainable without a functioning 
CCD (Muzyka et al., 1996).  Riquelme and Watson (2002) revealed that to deliver value, a 
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funding agency would invest in a team rather than in a single individual (i.e., entrepreneur). They 
added that it is better to have a team with a track record of working together in the past than a 
group of individuals with only social ties.  
The CCD of an acquired company postfunding will face environments that may become 
unstable due to increases in the complexity of the decision-making process, uncertainty of 
expectations, and the ambiguity of the future (Carmeli et al., 2008). Firms that mandate CCD 
participation in the decision-making process will retain and create value (Carmeli et al., 2008).  
Low firm performance (impeding value creation) can contribute to restricting information 
procedures and centralized decision-making (Heyden, Doorn, Reimer, Bosch, & Volberda, 2013).  
Additional loss of value corresponds to the turnover rate of the CCD. The following four factors 
represent possible antecedents to turnover postfunding: (a) acquired firms relative performance 
and size (low), (b) independence of the acquired CCD, (c) negligible status granted to the CCD of 
the acquired firm, and (d) a communication deficiency (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). 
Additionally, CCD will be influenced by perceived independence and cultural differences of the 
firms (Butler et al., 2012). In a change of control situation, the turnover of the CCD has been 
found to be value-destructive, and retaining CCD may contribute to postacquisition success 
(Ranft & Lord, 2002) attributed to communal and intellectual capital and ability to understand 
where to extract value across the firm (Butler et.al., 2012). If incompatibilities in the organization 
exist, full integration may cause value destruction, as integration could possibly deteriorate 
strategic capabilities on both sides of the merger (Marlin, Lamont, & Geiger, 2004). The CCD 
and the funding agency’s management compatibility may be essential to firm performance 
postacquisition, irrespective of the level of operational integration (Tanure, Cancado, Duarte, & 
Muylder, 2009). 
Track record, structure, and the ability of a CCD to work together in varied situations are 
cited as antecedents to firm performance. Funding agencies’ approaches to integration, addressing 
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incompatibilities along with CCD retention, are contributors to performance.  A CCD that has 
history together (increased interaction) and is conjoined to the view of accomplishing tasks may 
lead to a performance increase.  
CCD Collective Efficacy 
CCD’s efficacy for this dissertation is defined as the conjoined perspective of the CCD’s 
capabilities to complete tasks under diverse circumstances (Bandura, 1997). Corresponding to the 
perspective that firm performance will be influenced positively by the CCD, firm performance 
will materialize when the CCD has a high level of efficacy. The results produced by the efforts of 
the CCD will be shaped by efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1997).  CCD with high efficacy anticipates 
positive outcomes; alternatively, low efficacy will come with modest results (Krueger & Dickson, 
1993). How the CCD views impediments will also be influenced by efficacy beliefs: CCD with a 
marginal efficacy focus when faced with difficulty will consider costs and become risk-averse, 
not consider that difficulty as an opportunity (Bandura, 2002). 
People need to feel that they can accomplish the task and avoid the undesirable ones, 
giving them a reason to act (Bandura, 2000). Efficacy at a group level is defined using various 
terms, most of which can generally be applied to either group, collective, or team efficacy. 
Bandura (1982) was among the first to identify group-level efficacy and termed it collective 
efficacy. Bandura (1997) wrote, “Collective efficacy represents a group’s shared belief in its 
conjoint capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given 
levels of attainments” (p. 477). Collective efficacy has also been defined as situational regarding 
the group’s perception of the capability as a whole in performing and executing on the task 
(Prussia & Kinicki, 1996). Collective efficacy refers to the belief that the team can efficiently 
complete a particular task (Lindsley, Brass, & Thomas, 1995). Group efficacy has also been 
defined as individuals’ work within a group utilizing their pool of knowledge, competencies, and 
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resources to solve problems through mutual support (Lamb II, 2009).  Collective efficacy reflects 
the CCD’s conjoined view on how well they complete a task. Thus it can be seen as one of the 
primary motivational constructs: Higher levels of effort and persistence will be the result of high 
levels of group-level efficacy (Peterson, Mitchell, Thompson, & Burr, 2000).   
Collective efficacy can be an initiator for collaboration among the group. It is possible 
that the interaction/communication will produce higher efficacy; accordingly,  a team with higher 
efficacy is more likely to push forward during times when conjoined efforts have failed (Bandura, 
1982, 1997; Gully, Incalcaterra, Joshi, & Beaubien, 2002). The performance level and the 
collective efficacy of the CCD may depend on how they view a task: Do they consider it a threat 
or an opportunity (Porter, Gogus, & Yu, 2011)?  A group can have a high or a low level of 
efficacy, the former acknowledging a sustained level of confidence in the CCD that it will be able 
to succeed in completing tasks.  “The higher the sense of collective efficacy, the better the team 
performance” (Bandura, 1997, p. 470). The shared belief has been suggested to have an effect on 
group performance (Chen, Yao, & Kotha, 2002; Gibson, 1999).  
Developing an understanding of the relationship at group level and self-efficacy is 
important when considering all interactions as a group and as an individual. Self-efficacy is a key 
element of social cognitive theory developed by Bandura (1977), and the definition resembles 
collective efficacy. Self-efficacy has been defined as the inner belief of oneself in their 
capabilities to arrange and follow through with a course of action resulting in the desired outcome 
(Hoyt, Murphy, & Halverson, 2003).  The commitment and mission of the group can be affected 
by the level of group-level efficacy within the group, determining how the group will work 
together and its resilience when faced with adversity (Bandura, 1997). The group member’s 
individual aptitudes and past performance are defining parts of his/her conclusion in the group’s 
capability (Peterson et al., 2000).  The capability of the group may also depend on the knowledge 
it has gained over time as a group.  The greater the group interaction, the greater the knowledge 
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gained about fellow members of the group on how their individual abilities coalesce as a whole 
(Riggs & Knight, 1994).   
Extensive research postulates that self-efficacy is an antecedent of group-level efficacy. 
Research has shown that individuals who believed they have the skills to complete the tasks will 
be productive; likewise, those with low efficacy are not as productive. Efficacy is believed to 
function at a group level and can be considered task-specific or situational (Alper, Tjosvold, & 
Law, 2000).  However, a measure of this type of collaboration (i.e., management team’s 
perceived group efficacy) should not be considered the summation of the individual’s efficacy; 
rather, it is an emergent group-level property (Bandura, 1997).  Self-efficacy is an antecedent of 
group efficacy but is thought not to have a causal relationship (Lamb II, 2009). In some fields, 
self-efficacy has been found to be closely related to collective efficacy but is still considered to be 
independent constructs (Hoyt et al., 2003).  Bandura (2000) emphasized the importance of 
understanding that collective efficacy is not just an expansion of self-efficacy at group level, as 
the group’s performance is not simply the summary of the knowledge and ability of its members. 
Collective efficacy depends on the collaboration and synergy in the group during interface. 
Conversely, collective and self-efficacy are less distinguishable when the group is less 
interdependent (tasks that require group dependence encourage dominance of collective over self-
efficacy; Katz-Navon & Erez, 2005). 
Creating a CCD to accomplish a task requires a level of interdependence that may 
develop among members. The level of interdependence of the group is thought to be task-
dependent and encompasses the time a group has worked together, identified as the amount of 
interdependence of the members’ task-driven interaction (Gully et al., 2002). The conjoined 
belief of the group results from shared exposure to the same environment that creates competition 
and accelerates performance (Lindsley et al., 1995).  Groups that have been able to develop a 
high level of collective efficacy have the ability to affect an organization in a positive manner 
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through their ability and willingness to work together as a group for an extended period of time, 
creating a sustainable increase in performance at the company level (Pescosolido, 2003).  
Gibson (1999) defined group efficacy as the estimate of its collective ability to perform a 
precise task. A group’s level of efficacy is different from its general confidence, which is an 
affective state and efficacy is ability to complete a task on hand (Pescosolido, 2003). Whyte 
(1998) cautioned that high collective efficacy can result in overconfidence, leading to 
complacency and reductions in engagement (conflict process) and attentiveness. High levels of 
collective efficacy have been posited to limit the group from fully pondering differing procedures 
and strategies during task completion (Goncalo, Polman, & Maslach, 2010). 
Leadership is critical in early stages of the development of collective efficacy and during 
the entire cycle of the group (development and sustainment; Watson, Chemers, & Presier, 2001).  
The group leader in most cases is the individual with the highest status among the group; as a 
leader, he or she is able to process the information, facilitate interaction, and allocate resources to 
ensure the task is completed (Gibson, 2003).  Leaders who have earned credibility in the group 
can deploy its collective efficacy through persuasion and familiarity with the task (Gist, 1987).  
Campion, Medsker, and Higgs (1993) found that of 19 characteristics, the strongest 
predictor of performance is the belief in the effectiveness of the group. A strong sense of 
collective efficacy inspires group members to achieve goals and to endure through difficult tasks; 
subsequently, these groups are more likely to succeed than teams that do not have a collective 
view of their abilities to address tasks (Goncalo et al., 2010). Collective efficacy has a 
relationship to performance. As interdependence grows higher, so does performance (Gully et al., 
2002).  Gully et al. (2002) mentioned a limited negative relationship between collective efficacy 
and performance. However, Prussia and Kincki (1996) discovered that collective goals and 
performance were positively related to collective efficacy, concurring with the broad view that 
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collective efficacy mediates performance.  Goncalo et al. (2010) cautioned about a trade-off 
between confidence and harmony in a group and the group’s productive conflict. They suggested 
that the length of time the group has been together is a possible variable to consider when 
measuring performance. Premature growth of collective efficacy will suppress the benefits gained 
due to lack of productive conflict (Goncalo et al., 2010).   
Research indicated that the performance is positively related to collective efficacy.  This 
connection was confirmed by a study of 416 college students who were divided into 104 teams of 
four people to complete a computerized decision-making task in groups (Porter et al., 2011). 
Gully et al. (2002) showed a high level of support between performance and efficacy as well, as 
have other researchers (Stajkovic, Lee, & Nyberg, 2009; Porter et al., 2011).  Strajkovic et al.’s 
(2009) meta-analysis with findings from 69 studies, 83 adjusted correlation estimates, 4250 
groups, and 18,891 individuals showed the role of collective efficacy in positive relationship in 
group performance. 
CCD’s collective efficacy is defined as the group’s collective thought of accomplishing a 
task that has been a key to group efficiency and motivation (Bandura, 1997; Gully et al., 2002).  
CCD’s efficacy level is related to firm performance, and both its efficacy and its performance can 
be increased with the level of collaboration and synergy.  Additionally, CCD can view tasks 
differently; it can see the task as a threat or as an opportunity, and the orientation of its approach 
in reaching the goal of completing the task will induce other contextual variables. 
CCD Regulatory Focus Theory: Promotion and Prevention Foci 
The foundation of regulatory focus theory suggests that all strategies and actions engaged 
in by the individuals are contingent on their regulatory focus, which can be defined as their 
preferred way of achieving goals (Rusetski & Lim, 2011).  Regulatory focus consists of two 
distinct motivational orientations, promotion and prevention, each influencing goal setting, 
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strategy planning, and execution (Higgins, 1997).  A natural alignment strategy of promotion 
focus would include sensitivity to positive outcomes with growth and development needs 
quenched by striving to achieve objectives and rewards through goal realization (Higgins, 1997, 
2000).  A prevention focus alignment would include sensitivity to negative outcomes, with the 
need for security, safety that involves achieving commitments through responsible behavior 
(Wallace, Butts, Johnson, Stevens, & Smith, 2013).  For example, a member of a CCD with a 
promotion focus will tend to consider varied options, try more strategies, and be less likely to 
give up (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Ellemers, 2008).  Alternatively, a CCD with a prevention focus 
faced with the possibility of a loss triggers an avoidance-dominating strategy (Rusetski & Lim, 
2011). 
Individuals become a member of a group once they begin to categorize themselves as part 
of a group rather than as individual; hence, consistently identifying oneself as a member of the 
group will improve alignment with the group norms, and the individual will become affected by 
group-relevant events (Sassenberg & Wotin, 2009). An individual’s cognitive behavior will begin 
to alter once exposed to a group atmosphere. The individuals in these groups make increasingly 
polarized decisions, relying on the characteristics of the group either showing a risky shift or a 
cautious shift; these examples are consistent with the thought that individuals’ behaviors and their 
decision-making process are influenced by their membership in a group (Faddegon, Scheepers, & 
Ellemers, 2008).  Levine et al. (2000) were among the first to test regulatory focus in a small 
group. The results indicated that members’ responses conjoined with a directional bias in strategic 
orientation, emphasizing that promotion-focused CCDs were willing to take on more risk than 
prevention-focused CCDs. Group-regulatory focus theory suggests that members of a CCD 
develop their shared perspective on risk (promotion) versus conservatism (prevention). The study 
can be used as an extension to regulatory focus in a work/group setting; individuals participating 
in a group setting will align in motivational orientation (Florack & Hartmann, 2007).  Prevention-
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focus views goals as ‘non-loss’ or ‘loss’ with the potential for negative outcomes that will begin 
to offset the prospect for performance rewards, leaving a status-quo environment (Wallace et al., 
2013).   
Relating regulatory focus to group (see also Johnson & Wallace, 2011) situations and 
decision-making has gained much momentum (Levine et al., 2000; Sassenberg, Jonas, Shah, & 
Brazy, 2007; Sassenberg, Kessler, & Mummendey, 2003; Shah, Brazy, & Higgins, 2004). Shah et 
al. (2004) focused their research on group-level and common identity-based regulatory focus, 
which they refer to as collective regulatory focus, defined as the CCD’s identity driven by 
objectives and tactics, which will focus individual group members to have a promotion or 
prevention bias (task dependent). Collective regulatory focus may also be seen as a group norm or 
plan that operates through the social identity of its members in a procedure known as social 
categorization (Faddegon et al., 2008). Research shows that group decisions will align with 
shared regulatory bias that will develop over time (Florack & Hartmann, 2007). 
Once individuals become part of a group, then their thinking and behavior will not simply 
represent their individual regulatory orientation (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987). Individuals in a group neglect their chronic regulatory orientation in favor of group 
norms/groupthink (Hart, 1991).  Group membership will influence strategies when making 
decisions, suggesting that regulatory focus of the group will dominate the decision-making 
strategy and is not the summation of individual regulatory orientation (Faddegon et al., 2008).  
Group decision may resemble the characteristics of the group, consisting of a more differentiated 
decision orientation with either a risk or a cautious bias (Fraser, Gouge, & Billig, 1971; ; Myers, 
1982; Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1962).  
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Regulatory Fit  
Higgins’ theory of regulatory fit states that the strength of the motivation will increase 
when the goal attainment is in line with current regulatory focus (Spiegel, Grant-Pillow, & 
Higgins, 2004). That is, actions, occasions, and items that match the regulatory focus are highly 
sought after more than ones that do not have fit (Sassenberg et al., 2007). Fit will be experienced 
when people implement goals or pursue plans or actions that sustain their regulatory orientation 
(Avent & Higgins, 2006).  The regulatory fit has two components: “feeling right” and strength of 
engagement (Aaker & Lee, 2006).  Achieving a state of higher fit is possible when goal 
attainment involves increased level of eagerness, which is less probable when protecting against a 
non-gain; alternatively, to protect against a loss would require more vigilance than going in for a 
non-loss (Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000; Lee & Aaker, 2004). 
People who aggressively replicate and develop an approach-oriented plan can be 
considered to have a promotion orientation; accordingly, plans that stay within their regulatory 
orientation will provide them regulatory fit, which, in turn, should produce higher achievement of 
goals than when a promotion-oriented person attempts to utilize a vigilante development plan of 
avoidance (Spiegel et al., 2004). Alternatively, a plan driven by a prevention orientation would 
need to be vigilant in the simulation and development of an avoidance-centered plan, resulting in 
a regulatory fit yielding better results in goal completion (Spiegel et al., 2004). 
Greiner, Bhambri, and Cummings (2003) indicated that actions by the leader have to be 
spontaneous in relation to the task, reflecting that leader’s orientation. Wallace et al. (2010) 
suggested that a leader’s regulator focus (promotion or prevention) is governed by the 
environment. They also stated that regulatory fit is achieved in case of convergence between 
operational environment (constancy or lack thereof) and the leaders’ regulatory orientation. 
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Spiegel et al. (2004) conducted a study with individuals with a confirmed chronic 
regulatory focus, framing the task in either vigilant or eager terms to extend the understanding of 
fit between task orientation and chronic regulatory focus and the role of regulatory fit. The results 
confirmed that regulatory fit has a profound impact on goal completion (turning in the report): 
Individuals with regulatory fit were 50% more likely to turn in the report. It is important to note 
that neither a promotion/prevention focus nor strategic means dominated the decision to turn in 
the report, suggesting that regulatory fit influenced the individuals’ conduct (Spiegel, et al., 
2004). When a team exceeds performance targets, it is due in part to the fit between the structure 
and the regulatory focus of the task (Dimotakis, Davison, & Hollenbeck, 2012). 
Funding Climate 
The literature on funding climate is sparse to nonexistent. Wallace et al. (2013) defined 
funding climate as the collective perception that the leadership team of an organization has of the 
funding agency.  
To gain an increased perspective of funding climate, a review of the funding agency is 
needed.  In general terms, funding agencies include most types of nonpublic funding agencies. A 
second distinction of a funding agency is that the funds generally are equity capital. The capital 
comes from sponsors, investors, and funds that are usually invested directly into private 
companies, achieving majority equity share and control of the company. Funding agencies, in 
general, are not listed nor do they invest in a stock exchange (public markets); instead, their 
function is to inject capital with the sole purpose of expanding businesses or business idea, 
requiring a majority share in the form of equity (James, 2010).  Further, once the private equity 
acquires the company, it may get involved more with the CCD. Private equity can take on many 
forms: angel investor (high-net-worth individuals), early stage venture capital, late-stage venture 
capital, and buyouts (Cendrowski & Wadecki, 2012).  A funding agency operates with a set 
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procedure depending on its cycle and environment; these procedures dictate how an agency reacts 
to venture opportunities.  
Climate is not new. Researchers have been defining organizational climate since the 
1930s.  Hawthorne pioneered the human-relations movement turning researchers’ attention to the   
psychological environment within organizations. Climate can be partitioned into two forms: 
foundation and specific; “Foundation” or overall climate embodies a larger shared perspective of 
an environment, and “Specific” as the word suggests encompasses a specific area of interest 
(safety, service, etc.; Wallace & Chen, 2006). This research is foundational, due to the shared 
nature of the organizational climate. Climate should not be confused with culture, which can be 
described in five components—values, beliefs, myths, traditions and norms—unlike culture, 
climate focuses on the perception of those engaged in the environment (Kennedy Group 
Executive Strategies, n.d.).  
Although many contextual variables have been identified as influencing business success, 
many scholars have stressed the importance of climate (Amabile, Contu, Coon, Lazenby, & 
Herron, 1996).  Climate, the collective perception of the work atmosphere, is a key factor in the 
organization gaining a competitive advantage. Organizational climate can be defined as 
“experientially based description of what people see and report happening to them in an 
organizational situation” (Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003, p. 644).  Organization climate is 
reflective of the conjoined belief of the CCD, bringing relevance to the organizational 
environment in reference to what is important, anticipated, and rewarded through practices and 
guidelines, processes, routines, and remuneration (Ostroff et al., 2003). 
There is sufficient research to support the notion that workplace climate can positively 
influence job performance (King, De Charmont, West, Dawson, & Hebl, 2007).  Researchers in 
the area of climate have been able to discriminate between good and bad work environments, 
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high- and low-performing work teams, and perceived levels of support (Isaksen & Ekvall, 2010).  
Climate dimensions (e.g., safety, service, innovation, involvement) have shown positive 
relationships to a number of outcome variables, including higher sales volume, market share, 
productivity, and profitability, reporting a greater impact from implementing new social and 
technical systems and improved ability to implement more complex work design (Kuenzi & 
Schminke, 2009) consistent with firm performance measures.   
Towards Funding Climate 
Theories from ecology have made their way into various business applications to provide 
a better understanding of business behavior.  The Lotka-Volterra biological predator-prey model 
has been used by venture capital investors to help explain puzzling cycles similar to those seen in 
wildlife population (Brander & de Bettignies, 2009).  Predator-prey behavior has also been used 
in economic research in understanding oil prices and impact on the economy, copyright piracy, 
investing behavior, and consumer behavior (Andreoli, 2011; Burd, 2010; Vazquez & Watt, 2010; 
Wells, 2012).  It may be said that opportunities are subject to ordinary progress and are only 
affected by the actions of a predator.  Such is the case when a funding agency makes an 
investment, diminishing the pool of existing investment opportunities. Accordingly, predator-prey 
can be seen to contain a fractional justification of the investment behavioral cycle (Brander et al,, 
2009). Foraging theory can help researchers understand human foraging behavior in both ancient 
and modern hunter-gatherer populations in anthropological settings designed for studying human 
behavior (Wells, 2012).  
Foraging theory suggests the predator energy “uptake” is maximized by compromising 
between intake and cost, which depend on distinct prey qualities such as size, attack response, 
and handling time along with the atmospheric characteristics such as temperature and prey 
concentrations  (Shettleworth, Stephens, & Krebs, 1988).  Foraging strategies are diverse and 
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depend highly on the system to create decision rules.  Considering that a forger’s goal is to 
maximize energy “uptake,” the urgency for a forger with a time constraint is much greater than 
for those who have a digestion limit. Naturally famine will escalate the incentive to consume as 
much and as fast as possible, where repletion will have a negative influence on motivation to 
search for and consume, hence significantly reducing attack rates and time spent on foraging, 
which will increase digestive pauses (Hohberg & Traunspurger,  2009).   
Behavioral ecology and foraging theory provide a framework for understanding strategic 
feeding and consumption behavior of animals, including behaviors such as search, identification, 
procurement, handling, utilization, and digestion (Wells, 2012).  Studies in predator-prey 
interaction have shown predators can impact prey consumption through predator-induced 
alterations in foraging, habitat use, morphology, and other consumptive and nonconsumptive 
effects (Preisser, Orrock, & Schmitz, 2007).  
 Predators can be classified into three broad categories: Active, sit-and-pursue, and sit-
and-wait (Barbosa & Castellanos, 2005). Active predators continually patrol for prey by moving 
through their environment to find and capture their prey. Sharks, shrews, and jumping spiders are 
animals that demonstrate the characteristics of active predators.  Sit-and-pursue predators 
typically wait for their prey to approach before striking, either by ambushing or waiting for prey 
to come into close range to pounce.  This group may change its location upon depletion of prey in 
a particular area.  A hawk would be an example demonstrating this type of predatory behavior.  
The third type of predators are the sit-and-wait, which remain in one fixed location for extended 
periods waiting for the prey to pass by their location.  These predators do not change locations 
often, regardless of obtaining immediate prey or extended waiting. Crocodiles represent this type 
of behavior.  
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The Lotka-Volterra equation, or the predator-prey theory, has been applied to explain 
cycles in animal population fluctuations. The structure of predator-prey models is also clearly 
presented in standard textbooks on differential equations (Brander & Bettignies, 2009). To have a 
predator-prey state, one of the two species must survive by preying on the other. As the prey is 
consumed, the population of the predators grows and will continue to grow to a point in which the 
population of the prey is not sustainable and that of the predator will begin to diminish, leading to 
a recovery of the prey population, followed by revitalization of the predator population, thus 
creating cyclical behavior (Vazquez & Watt, 2010).  
Applying predator-prey theory to funding agencies is the foundation of creating the 
funding climate taxonomy. Scale development was completed utilizing Hinkin’s (1998) 
guidelines. Wallace et al. (2013) framed the broad spectrum of funding agencies, utilizing a 
deductive approach to item generation. The scale has been validated by surveying CCD of small 
to midsize companies that were involved in a funding event (i.e., acquired by or partially acquired 
with funding agencies funds).   
Based on the tenets of behavioral ecology of predator forging behavior a funding climate 
can be identified as: (a) active, (b) sit-and-pursue, and  (c) sit-and-wait (Barbosa & Castellanos, 
2005).  Active funding agencies (i.e., Sharks) may demonstrate attributes such as aggressively 
pursuing, investigating, and analyzing new venture opportunities to fund; moving across industry; 
and taking risks.  Sit-and-pursue funding agencies (i.e., Hawks) tend to passively observe funding 
opportunities and actively engage when an appropriate investment arises and are slower to move 
out of one sector but will as deal flows slow.  Finally, sit-and-wait funding agencies (i.e. 
Crocodiles) passively observe funding opportunities and wait for a new venture that meets its 
specific requirements to fully present itself. These agencies tend to wait for the right deal and 
have the staying power to do so and be successful.   
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  Contemplating the differences in funding climate and the effects it will have on the 
CCD create an opportunity to align (or, in other words, fit) these two groups, elevating the 
possibility to generate additional value for the company. CCD impacts firm performance through 
contextual considerations, including CCD efficacy, CCD collective regulatory focus, and funding 
climate. Accordingly, motivation will increase when goal attainment is in line with current 
regulatory focus (Spiegel et al., 2004). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
Theoretical Basis for Research 
The effect of the top management teams on performance of an organization has attracted 
tremendous attention from researchers across a wide range of disciplines. A limited amount of 
literature, however, examines the relationship between CCD efficacy and CCD (group) regulatory 
focus, and no literature assesses how these two constructs affect optimal fit and performance for 
an organization. Further, no study accounts for the relationship of the CCD’s collective view 
postfunding and fit with the funding agency. These gaps have created an opportunity to explore 
the effect of funding climate on a group’s regulatory focus via group efficacy in creating value. 
Could a better understanding of this relationship assist in developing a model for optimizing the 
fit between funding agency and CCD’s regulatory focus to increase the opportunity for 
organizational success during and following a funding event?   
CCD efficacy mediates the relationships between regulatory foci of promotion and 
prevention and firm performance. Further, and most importantly, funding climate operates as a 
key contextual influence on the mediated paths from promotion and prevention to firm 
performance via group efficacy. This moderated mediated model will help identify a more
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optimal fit between the firms’ focus and the funding style of a funding agency, ideally resulting in 
success of more ventures through firm performance and fewer failed funding transitions. 
Top Management Team Efficacy and Firm Performance  
CCD’s efficacy (collective) “represents a group’s shared belief in its conjoint capabilities 
to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given levels of attainments” 
(Bandura, 1997, p. 477). It can be considered the process by which individuals work in a group, 
utilizing their breadth of knowledge, competencies, and resources to solve problems through 
mutual support (Lamb II, 2009).  CCD’s role is to sustain the company’s competitive advantage 
(Hambrick et al., 2005) and can be defined by how they are differentiated from other 
management teams within the company. Typically, the CCD members will have responsibility as 
an executive and as a member of the executive team, consequently increasing their accountability 
significantly, as they are crucial to the decision-making process and strategy (Hambrick, 1993).  
CCD’s efficacy may also be situational concerning the group’s perception of their 
capability as an integrated group performing and executing on the task (Prussia &7 Kinicki, 
1996). Accordingly, CCD will need to navigate a number of situations during operations of a 
company, including the level of efficacy determining the performance on completion of the task. 
Value-added CCD outcomes may be accomplished through CCD efficacy, which can elevate 
their aspirations and desires and improve motivational fortitude towards accomplishing their task 
(Bandura, 2002). CCD may build off successful task completion, allowing for increased efficacy, 
which in return might yield better results for the company, thus identifying a clear relationship to 
firm performance. CCD’s capability during ambiguous tasks combined with low interdependence 
and collectivism had no relation to its efficacy (Gibson, 1999). Similarly, it is has been found that 
groups with low group efficacy levels struggle dealing with difficult group tasks (Jex & Bliese, 
1999).   
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Prior research has established a positive relationship between group efficacy and group 
success.  Further, Bandura (1986) found groups that held themselves to a higher standard of 
performance believed that their group could overcome difficulties to achieve results.  This finding 
suggests that a high group efficacy will yield better results on group tasks; therefore, it is 
plausible that a CCD will be able to handle the stresses related to a funding event more 
proficiently with a high efficacy.  “The higher the sense of collective efficacy, the better the team 
performance” (Bandura, 1997, p. 470). Accordingly, in this study, I anticipated replicating this 
relationship in my theoretical model:  
H1: CCD efficacy positively relates to Firm Performance. 
CCD Regulatory Focus and Efficacy 
The CCD functions as group developed to make decisions and accomplish tasks; the 
manner in which the CCD approaches and its ability to cope with the task creates a relationship 
between their shared regulatory focus and conjoined efficacy level. Supported by research, group 
decisions will align with the shared regulatory bias (Florack & Hartmann, 2007). CCD regulatory 
focus is defined as the group’s identity driven by the promotion or prevention-related objectives 
and tactics that will focus individual group members towards a promotion or prevention bias 
(Faddegon et al., 2008). A CCD’s regulatory focus may also be seen as a group norm or plan by 
which it operates using social identity of its members in a procedure known as social 
categorization (Faddegon et al., 2008).  
The dynamics in which the CCD works do not allow for perfectly structured and 
uniformed events.  Lanaj, Chang, and Johnson (2012) found that employees with a promotion 
focus, when confronted with unexpected challenges and adversities in the workplace, had positive 
feelings and had greater self-esteem and self-efficacy. Lower perceptions of self-efficacy were 
observed in employees with a prevention focus in a similar situation (Lanaj et al., 2012). The 
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roles of the employees who make up the CCD increase the chance of encountering a difficult and 
rapidly changing situation. These situations may require timely decisions that may involve a level 
of risk absorption, a trait not afforded by prevention-focused groups. In contrast, CCD with a 
promotion focus is inspired by attainment of positive goals; hence CCD is willing to take risks to 
improve the opportunity of successfully achieving its goals and will possess higher levels of self-
efficacy (Lanaj et al., 2012). Bryant (2009) and Wallace et al. (2009) showed that promotion 
focus will have a positive outcome with efficacy. Lanaj et al. (2012) described how prevention-
focused CCD will be thoughtful in achieving the targets; however, doing so may not improve the 
CCD’s chances of accomplishing difficult tasks. Lanaj et al. (2012) explained duties and 
responsibilities often result in conservatism, which may reduce performance (which is highly 
related to high efficacy levels), in turn reducing the relation between CCD regulatory focus and 
CCD self- efficacy. 
These arguments are supported by literature; contrasting results might emerge depending 
on the regulatory focus of the CCD in relation to CCD efficacy. For this study, then, I proposed 
the following hypotheses: 
H2: CCD Prevention Focus negatively relates to CCD Efficacy.  
H3: CCD Promotion Focus positively relates to CCD Efficacy. 
Funding Climate as a Moderator  
Funding climate as covered in the literature review is a “new” construct and is defined as 
the collective perception of the funding agency by CCD.  Each funding agency functions 
distinctly in its investment strategy and the value it holds in its current CCD (management as a 
whole, in some cases). Funding agencies are known to use a “gut feel” approach to making 
decisions on whether or not to invest in the funding opportunity (Chen et al., 2009) and to access 
the track record and characteristics of the CCD while evaluating investment opportunities (Mason 
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& Stark, 2004).  They have been dubbed as obsessive when considering CCD competence as they 
move towards making an investment. This broad differentiation contributed to the development 
of the taxonomy by Wallace et al. (2013) based on the tenets of behavioral ecology of predator 
foraging behavior. In this framework, a funding climate can be identified as: (a) Active, (b) Sit-
and-Pursue, and  (c) Sit-and-Wait (Barbosa & Castellanos, 2005).  Active private equity (i.e., 
Sharks) may demonstrate attributes such as aggressively pursuing, investigating, and analyzing 
new venture opportunities to fund.  Sit-and-Pursue (i.e., Hawks) firms tend to passively observe 
funding opportunities and actively engage when an appropriate investment arises.   Finally, Sit-
and-Wait funding agencies (i.e., Crocodiles) passively observe funding opportunities and wait for 
a new venture to fully present itself and meets its specific requirements (i.e., strong CCD).  Fit 
between a funding agency and CCD may depend on the funding climate exhibited by the funding 
agency and the regulatory focus of the CCD.   
Post-funding, the CCD and the funding agency may have different ways of taking the 
plan forward.  The ability to manage these types of environments may depend on the CCD’s 
regulatory focus. In an environment with high uncertainty, a promotion focus  (eager) is not 
uncommon, which will create a positive influence on the environment as it is characterized by 
quick adaption and measured risks (Förster, Higgins, & Bianco, 2003).  Factors that influence the 
decision are the characteristics of the CCD, including its nature, experience, and its interaction 
with the private equity (Chen et al., 2009).  At one end of the scale is Sit-and-Wait (Crocodile). 
its characteristics are consistent with how they invest, typically waiting for the right CCD and the 
right business (idea) that will create maximum value. A CCD with promotion focus and a high 
efficacy level will have a positive relation to firm performance. Funding agencies rely on the 
CCD to deliver the anticipated return; it is possibly for this reason that funding agencies rank 
CCD as one of the most important components of a company (Chen et al., 2009).  The three 
funding climates come with a distinctive prospectus on the make-up of the CCD and generally 
28 
 
utilize their experience in deciding the type of CCD required (venture-specific).  That is, an active 
funding climate may consider a promotion-focused CCD to be a disadvantage, as it might 
consider itself to have the necessary strategy and aggressive nature needed to achieve a high level 
of value creation. Aggressive (Active) funding-climate-oriented companies commonly change out 
the CCD expeditiously post-funding, resulting in a lack of fit for promotion-focused CCDs.  
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) described a scenario in which the funding agency’s ability to provide 
superior management and advisory and reputational inputs will help them gain advantage and 
preferential pricing while making an offer to the firm and CCD.  
The climate in an organization progressively changes as the level of interaction between 
the CCD and the funding agency increases during a funding cycle.  The type of relationship the 
funding agency requires with the organization, particularly with the CCD, varies significantly and 
is dictated by the funding climate. A Sit-and-Wait funding climate observes funding opportunities 
passively and waits for the right business opportunity and the right CCD. It typically looks for 
high-performing CCD that will create value and view its investment as a source of capital for 
expansion.  The literature shows a partial contributor to creating value in a company through a 
CCD is one with a promotional focus, which could lead to increased efficacy. Regulatory fit will 
be at the highest level for a CCD with promotion focus when moderated by a Sit-and-Wait 
funding climate. Wallace et al. (2010) wrote that regulatory fit is achieved when similarity 
between the operational environment (constancy, or lack thereof) and the leader’s regulatory 
orientation converge.  Hence, an active funding climate with aggressive nature will naturally want 
to be the alpha (take the lead) and would not fit with a promotion-focused CCD.  A prevention-
focused CCD who strives for goal attainment through security and is risk-averse would not enable 
a Sit-and-Wait funding climate to achieve maximum value;  consequently, an active funding 
climate would allow a prevention-focus CCD to stay in its regulatory orientation as it would 
make decisions on the CCD.  A prevention-focus alignment would include sensitivity to negative 
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outcomes with the need for security and safety that involves achieving commitments through 
responsible behavior (Wallace et al., 2013). 
The funding agency’s autonomous scheme postfunding is determined by the 
differentiation of its funding climate, which parallels the regulatory focus, and efficacy level of 
the CCD during the funding cycle will dictate the value created.  For this study, then, I offered the 
following suggestions (see also Figures 2 and 3): 
H4: A Sit-and-Wait funding climate will positively impact the relationship between CCD 
Promotion Focus and CCD Efficacy such that when Sit-and-Wait funding climate is high, 
the relationship between CCD Promotion and CCD Efficacy will be more positive as 
opposed to when it is low.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction of CCD Regulatory Focus on Sit & Wait Funding Climate  
H5: An Active funding climate will impact the relationship between CCD Prevention 
Focus and CCD Efficacy positively such that when Active Funding Climate is high, the 
relationship between CCD Prevention and CCD Efficacy will be positive as opposed to 
negative when Active is low. 
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Figure 3. Interaction of CCD Regulatory Focus on Active Funding Climate  
Firm Performance  
Funding climate’s moderating effect on CCD regulatory focus as mediated by CCD 
efficacy may contain a partial answer to firm performance, postulating promising insight into a 
practical and rewarding optimal fit between the funding agency and the CCD.  In a private equity 
environment (companies owned in full or majority by funding agency), the CCD is valued 
differently depending on the funding climate of the funding agency, with the constant being that 
all funding climates require a return on their investment. Predator-prey theory suggests that 
predators not only eat their prey but also induce possible phenotypic trait alterations that may 
reduce the risk of mortality (Preisser, Bolnick, & Benard, 2005). Both promotion- and 
prevention-focused CCD can be successful in creating value in different situations, and demands 
are placed on it to deliver.  During the business process, either a promotion or a prevention focus 
will generate the highest level of firm performance, and idea generation would lend to 
promotional focus; alternatively, during the screening of ideas, a prevention focus will yield the 
best results (Brockner, Higgins, & Low, 2004).  
When capital is necessary or a company is acquired, additional demands will be placed 
on the CCD, in part due to the funding climate that will dictate the approach to CCD. How the 
CCD copes with the additional demands may depend on the regulatory focus and efficacy level of 
the CCD.  The anticipation of job loss or the ambiguous nature of the new demands modeled by 
C
C
D
 C
o
ll
e
ct
iv
e
 E
ff
ic
a
cy
 
CCD Regulatory Focus 
31 
 
changes will force the CCD to shift the focus instantaneously from regulatory to prevention 
(Brockner & Higgins, 2001).  An active funding climate may induce concerns over job retention; 
aggressive nature may increase a prevention-focused CCD, thus moving away from a regulatory 
fit of promotion-focused CCD. Regulatory fit theory suggests a high level of engagement by the 
CCD when a promotion focus engages in a task eagerly; alternatively, a prevention-focused CCD 
will excel in an activity that requires vigilance, compared to nonfit prevention/eager 
promotion/vigilant (Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden, 2003; Higgins, Spiegel, Cerario, 
Hagiwara & Pittman, 2010).  A strong regulatory fit among the CCD has shown to increase the 
level of engagement; the right fit may also increase the conjoined view of the ability of the CCD 
(high efficacy) that will increase the efficiency of the CCD in creating value for the company.  
The level of engagement and the fulfillment of the feeling-right experience might increase with 
regulatory fit, and the benefits of strong engagement are that the CCD will stay involved, 
interested, and occupied with the task (Avnet & Higgins, 2006).  Additionally, regulating a CCD 
behavior through promotion and prevention foci will impact goal achievement in a variety of 
domains (Appelt & Higgins, 2010).  
Enabling a closer match between CCD’s chronic regulatory focus and the environment in 
which the regulatory foci will thrive is one piece to firm performance. By capitalizing on the 
CCD’s true potential, a fit between the funding climate and the CCD may help achieve better 
performance. A business environment becomes somewhat task specific and may place demands 
on the CCD to work in a collective manner, and a group with high efficacy should allow for 
greater firm performance. Bandura (2006) wrote that CCD with lower group efficacy is more 
concerned with preventing violations of behavioral norms.  This concern contrasts with a CCD 
with high group efficacy that sets advanced goals and achieves a higher level than one with lower 
group efficacy as its primary focus will lead to failure, not success (Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 
2012; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). 
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CCD efficacy mediates the relationships between regulatory foci of promotion and prevention on 
firm performance. Further, and most importantly, funding climate operates as a key contextual 
influence on the mediated paths from promotion and prevention to firm performance via group 
efficacy. Accordingly, I anticipated this relationship in my theoretical model for this study:  
H6: CCD Efficacy will mediate the moderated effect of Group Promotion Focus and Sit- 
and-Wait Funding Climate on Firm Performance.  
H7: CCD Efficacy will mediate the moderated effect of Group Prevention Focus and 
Active Funding Climate on Firm Performance. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 This chapter examines the methodology used in testing this study’s seven hypotheses. It 
includes a review of the participants and procedure, measures, and data analysis.  
Participants and Procedure 
To test the hypotheses, surveys were conducted among the CCDs of 50 (plus) companies, 
which included but were not limited to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO), and Chief Operating Officer (COO).  See Table 1 for details. The title held by the 
participants was not as important as the recruitment of the correct individual at a senior level who 
had first-hand knowledge of the most recent funding event and operations. A total of 150 (plus) 
executives were anticipated to participate in the survey.  In fact, there were two surveys: The first 
was for the CEO and COO, and the second for the CFO.  The recruitment sample across the 72 
companies consisted of 52 CCD and 65 CFO (financial official) participated, from whom all 
usable self-report data were utilized to calculate the response rate. The CCD who participated in 
the study hailed from five countries and four industries. This study was constructed at a group-
level, and the individual results from the CEO and COO applicable surveys were aggregated by 
these categories: Funding Climate, CCD Regulatory Focus, CCD Collective Efficacy, and Firm 
34 
 
Performance.  CEO and COO individual surveys consisted of an assortment of demographic 
questions, including years with the company equity position.  The CFO completed surveys on 
Firm Performance and an assortment of demographic questions, including years with the 
company equity position. 
Table 1 
Participant Survey Matrix 
Participant 
Item Count 
(xx) 
Demographic 
Variables 
Fundin
g 
Climate 
CCD 
Regulatory 
CCD 
Efficacy 
Firm 
Performanc
e 
CEO & COO X (10) X (22) X (8) X (4) X (6) 
CFO X (6)    X (34) 
 
The CEO and COO participants were invited via an email message that included a link to 
the survey and requested the email address of the financial leader (CFO) of the company.  
Additionally, surveys were sent directly to the CFO of the companies where applicable. The study 
was conducted online; all participants had the choice of not answering any question that they did 
not want to answer. All risks were evaluated and determined to be no greater than those ordinarily 
encountered in their daily business life with zero compensation for participation.   
Regarding confidentiality, all information about the participants and their responses are 
and will remain strictly confidential. Their responses are and will be stored securely, and only 
researchers and individuals responsible for research oversight have access to the records.   
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Measures 
Firm Performance 
Firm performance was measured by seeking the management team’s opinions on the 
following questions. The items were expert-validated by multiple successful entrepreneurs and 
funding experts:  
1. Has the company been able to stay within the covenants of the funding 
structure/terms?  
2. Have you been fairly compensated by the funding agency?  
3. How satisfied are you with the funding source?  
4. Did the management team have to adapt to the style of the funding agency?  
5. Has the funding agency allowed the company to sustain growth?  
6. Has the funding agency allowed the company to sustain profitability?  
I conducted appropriate psychometric assessments of these items (internal consistency, 
confirmatory factor analysis) to validate. I also used a 14-item measure of firm performance 
adapted by Gilley and Rasheed (2000) from the initial measure developed by Dess and Robinson 
(1984) and Pearce, Robbins, and Robinson (1987). This measure was completed by CFOs to 
provide self- and external ratings of a new firm’s success/performance. The instrument chosen for 
this research captured each of the three dimensions recommended by Richard, Yip, and Johnson 
(2009).  Specifically, this measure captured financial performance (four items—return on assets, 
return on sales, sales growth, and overall financial performance), stakeholder performance (five 
items—stability/growth of employment, employee morale/job satisfaction, customer relations, 
supplier relations, overall nonfinancial performance), and heterogeneity with regard to resource 
allocation strategies (five items—funds allocated to R&D, funds allocated to advertising, process 
innovation, product innovation, and compensation to employees; Wallace et al., 2010).  
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CCD’s Collective Efficacy 
CCD collective efficacy was measured utilizing a 4-item survey that followed 
considerations/requirements for defining attributes of a group laid out in Gibson, Randel, and 
Earley (2000).  Gibson et al. (2000) suggested not relying on a specific trial of a specific task but 
rather conceptualizing as the conjoined view of the capability the group possesses to complete the 
task.  Bandura (2000) contemplated two methods for measuring collective efficacy. The first 
method is the aggregate of the group member’s assessment of the performance of the functions of 
the group.  The second approach is the aggregation of the group member assessment of the 
group’s capability (as a whole).  I employed the second approach, aggregating the CEO and COO 
assessment of the strength of the CCD. Research on collective efficacy has been effectively used 
with large samples of groups of nursing, management executives, students, and sport teams 
(Whiteoak, Chalip, & Hort, 2004).  
CCD’s Regulatory Focus  
Promotion and prevention focus items were modified to reflect a group-level measure on 
the basis of items reported in studies by Lockwood, Jordan, and Kunda (2002). The focus items 
included promotion (e.g., “In general, we are focused on achieving positive outcomes as opposed 
to preventing negative outcomes”) and prevention (e.g., “We are more oriented toward preventing 
losses than we are toward achieving gains”). Participants responded to these items using a 5-point 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).  Previous use of this scale was found to be 
internally consistent (for promotion, α = .84; for prevention, α = .82) and provide good 
psychometric validation evidence (Wallace et al., 2009). Smith (2002) wrote, ‘‘Since self-
regulatory systems operate at individual, relational, and group levels, this process should operate 
in conceptually the same way at each level’’ (p. 33). 
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Funding Climate 
Funding climate was measured using 22 items on a 5-point scale from strongly disagree 
(with statement) to strongly agree.  Funding climate was developed by following Hinkin’s (1998) 
guidelines in completing the scale development process, utilizing a deductive approach to item 
generation.  The preliminary list was developed to evaluate the constructs under consideration 
and, additionally, provide construct validity. 
Analysis 
Psychometrics 
Theorizing the set of parameters through factor loading, correlations, and uniqueness was 
accomplished by modeling with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  CFA is an assessment rule 
that will accede or discard the hypothesis around a population factor structure based on the 
sample (Hurley et al., 1997).  
Control Variables  
The control variables included funding agency type: self-funded, debt (e.g., bank loan, 
lender, line of credit), angel (e.g., silent), equity (i.e., funds for stake/ownership in the company); 
firm size; work experience (years); equity position in firm; founder of firm; years the firm has 
been in business; and years with current funding agency.   
Aggregation 
My research required combining individual (lower-level) variables to represent group 
(high-level) constructs: CEO and COO response data for Funding Climate, CCD Group 
Regulatory Focus, and CCD Collective Efficacy.  When conceptual content fundamentally 
remains across levels, it is considered to be isomorphic, defined as the similarity between two or 
more elements (Bliese, Chan, & Ployhart, 2007).  Bliese, (2000) identified three steps to confirm 
practicability of aggregation: acceptable group homogeneity, acceptable group heterogeneity, and 
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that this group occurs naturally. To gain a understanding of within-group homogeneity, one may 
utilize the rwg (j) statistic (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1993). A rwg (j) is generally acceptable 
when it is greater than or equal to 0.70 (Lance, Butts, & Michels, 2006).  Additionally 
establishing within group homogeneity is reliability.  Reliability of a group level variable can 
measured using intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC). ICC (1) represents the amount of 
variance attributable to the members in a group known as the inter-rater reliability of the group 
(James, 1982).  ICC (2) represents the reliability of group means (Bliese, 2000). If the ICC (2) 
value is greater than or equal to 0.70,  it is assumed that group means are reliable (Bliese, 2000). 
Hypothesis Testing  
Correlation (r)-Pearson Correlation Coefficiency 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 required correlation analysis.  A bivariate correlation ranged from 
1 (perfectly positive linear relationship) to -1 (perfectly negative linear relationship) with zero 
indicating no relation.  Correlation indicated direction and strength and did not imply causation. 
A quick review of the scatter plot of the data indicated whether correlation could be used. 
Correlation of Hypothesis 1 was said to have a positive relation between CCD efficacy and Value 
Creation. A negative linear relationship between CCD Prevention and CCD efficacy was 
postulated in Hypothesis 2. A positive linear relationship between CCD Promotion and CCD 
efficacy was theorized in Hypothesis 3.  
Moderated Regression (Hypotheses 4 & 5)  
It is one of the most utilized models to understand the relationship among the three 
constructs in organizational psychology (Russell & Bobko, 1992). “Mediation analysis statistical 
method used to help answer the question as to how some causal agent X transmits its effect on Y” 
(Hayes, 2013, p. 86). A moderating variable (funding climate) will change the relationship 
between the independent variable (CCD promotion/prevention foci) and dependent variable 
(value creation) (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). A strong interaction between funding climate and 
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the CCD promotion/ prevention foci could be an indicator of the effect CCD 
promotion/prevention foci on value creation, which may change depending on the funding 
climate. Mean centering (increased interpretability) is generally recommended for moderated 
multiple regression analysis (Dalal & Zickar, 2011).    
Moderated-Mediated Regression (Hypotheses 6 & 7) 
The theoretical model I proposed is characterized as moderated mediation, where the 
indirect effect of CCD Regulatory Focus on Value Creation through CCD efficacy may be 
contingent on Funding Climate’s moderation of the relationship within the three constructs. To 
test Hypotheses 6 & 7, the moderated mediation of funding climate / CCD efficacy, I utilized 
“PROCESS,” a path analysis-based model created by Hayes (2013) for moderation or mediation 
as well as in combination. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The statistical analysis used to test Hypotheses 1 through 7 was described in previous 
chapters. The results are presented in five sections in this chapter, with the first section reviewing 
the data collection process and description of the sample. The second section addresses internal 
consistency and the relationship of each scale, qualitatively assessing and further developing the 
Funding Climate scale following Harkins’ scale development. The third section assesses the 
aggregation from first level measures, promotion, prevention, efficacy, and the Funding Climate 
(3) to the second level (group) as well as the reliability, homogeneity, and heterogeneity of the 
measures (Bliese, 2000). The fourth section describes the results of the hypotheses’ testing, 
utilizing correlation and regression analysis. The fifth section, in addition to the current 
qualitative study described throughout the previous chapters, is a qualitative study requested and 
agreed upon following the dissertation proposal defense, this pilot study can be found in the 
appendix of this document. 
Sample Description 
The target sample, as defined above, was CEO-COO (top management teams) and the 
CFO or equivalent within companies in a funding cycle. A funding cycle was defined as a 
company that received money for any business-centered reason. Sample details are presented in  
Table 2. Fifty CEO-COO Dyads (CCD) and 50 CFO company sample sets were achieved. Of
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the 200 plus companies that received the recruitment letter, 74 participated in the survey, varying 
in size, location, and industry. Data were collected over a sample time frame from July 2014 
through November 2014. All raters were recruited via email and a recruitment letter.  
Table 2  
Participant Job Title Description 
Job Title Dyad Sample Financial 
CEO, COO, CFO 84 40 
Vice President 27 11 
Manager/Controller 11 11 
Other 4 5 
Missing Title 4 4 
Total 126 71 
 
The criteria for matching the sample set remained as proposed, a dyad on the operation 
side and one financial person to corroborate Firm Performance. The requirement of all model 
relevant data points dictated the cleaning process. Internal consistency was run on all data points 
before second level grouping and reduction of the sample through controlled variable conditions. 
The remaining aggregated to the same size before funding source control was 46. Employing the 
funding source control variable further reduced the aggregated sample size to 34. Descriptive 
statistics and bivariate correlation for the aggregated dataset are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics (Individual Rater) 
   Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Efficacy 4.37 .469      
2 Prevention 2.85 .740 -.003     
3 Promotion 4.20 .565 .538** -.082    
4 Active 3.01 .766 .024 0.55 .104   
5 Sit/Wait 3.29 .446 -.065 .045 .046 -.152  
6 Sit/Pursue 2.82 .446 -.019 .257** .013 .043 .187 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).     
N=105       
Psychometrics 
Funding Climate 
The scale consists of 22 items on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree). Funding Climate (Wallace et al., 2013) was developed following Hinkin’s (1998) 
guidelines in completing the scale development and can be found in Appendix A. Funding 
Climate construct consists of three variables: (a) Active, (b) Sit-and-Pursue, and (c) Sit-and-Wait 
(Barbosa & Castellanos, 2005). Funding Climate with the combined 22 items broke down as 
follows: The 5-item scale for Active was tested for internal consistency with a Cronbach alpha 
coefficient (α) of 0.76; Sit-and-Pursue was tested for internal consistency on an 8-item scale 
having a Cronbach alpha coefficient (α) of 0.59; Sit-and-Wait scale consisted of 9 items having a 
Cronbach alpha coefficient (α) of 0.57. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was conducted to 
directly test Funding Climate hypotheses, and Mplus was used to model the Funding Climate 
CFA that consisted of 178 observations. The Funding Climate scale was constructed of 22 items; 
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13 items did not fit the model and were removed. Sit-and-Wait remained with three items, as did 
Sit-and-Pursue and Active. The Cronbach alpha coefficient (α) increased in all variables, starting 
with Sit-and-Wait, which remained consistent at (α) 0.60, while Sit-and-Pursue (α) increased to 
0.76 and Active had a slight increase to (α) 0.81.  
To confirm that a covariance matrix is contained within the sample data that “fits” with 
the hypothesized prediction, assessment of “goodness of fit” was done utilizing Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), which measures the “discrepancy per degree of 
freedom” (Brown & Cudeck, 1993). This three-factor model for Funding Climate has a 
reasonable fit with RMSEA = 0.078. Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) was calculated 
to assess how the model fit the data compared to a baseline model where the variables are not 
correlated. The model had a CFI score of 0.95, showing the model fit to be reasonable/good. The 
final measure reported to evaluate model fit was Standardized Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR; Joreskog & Sorborn, 1981), which is a measure of the mean absolute value of the 
correlation residuals, calculating the overall difference in the observed correlation and the 
predicted correlation. Values less than 0.80 can be considered favorable, suggesting that the 
SRMR of 0.061 represents a good fit.  
Regulatory Focus 
Promotion and prevention focus items were modified to reflect a group level measure on 
the basis of items reported in studies by Lockwood et al. (2002). The two factors of promotion 
and prevention theoretically construct regulatory focus, which was reduced to four prevention 
items and four promotion items that can be found in Appendix A. Internal consistency of the four 
prevention-focused group items reflected a α = 0.56, with promotion having a α 0.74 on a sample 
size of 109 for prevention and 107 for promotion.  
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Collective Efficacy  
Collective efficacy is defined as the conjoined perspective of the CCD’s capabilities to 
complete tasks under diverse circumstances (Bandura, 1997). Testing utilized a four-item survey 
that followed considerations/requirements for defining attributes of a group laid out in Gibson et 
al. (2000) and can be found in Appendix A with a sample size of 110 and collective efficacy of 
α = 0.50.  
Firm Performance 
This engages with three types of performance: (a) financial (e.g., return on assets, return 
on sales, sales growth, and overall financial performance), (b) stakeholder (e.g., stability/growth 
of employment, employee morale/job satisfaction, customer relations, supplier relations, and 
overall nonfinancial performance), and (c) heterogeneity with regard to resource allocation 
strategies (e.g., funds allocated to R&D, advertising, process innovation, product innovation, and 
compensation to employees; Wallace et al., 2010). The scale was comprised of 14 items the CFO 
rated and was used to reduce self-reporting of company performance. These 55 observations 
produced an internal consistency level of - α = .84. 
Aggregation 
Aggregation is the prerequisite to validate agreement among the CCD. Combining their 
individual observation (lower-level) variables to represent group (high-level) constructs was 
required using CEO and COO response data for Funding Climate, CCD Group Regulatory Focus, 
and CCD Collective Efficacy. It is critical to ensure items selected for the observation are derived 
by the theory the items are based upon (James, 1982). As suggested above, the three-step process 
of validation was followed as proposed by Bliese (2000). At a group level, the concept must first 
satisfy the requirement of inter-group homogeneity and between-group heterogeneity by existing 
naturally and not as a statistical artifact. 
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The first step used to assess the inter-rater agreement of this multilevel model was tested 
with the Rwg (j) statistic (James et al., 1984), reporting a uniform null. The Rwg (j) index compares 
the variance between the observation and a null distribution; agreement is achieved when the 
variance of observation is considerably less than would be anticipated under conditions of no 
agreement (Smith-Crowe, Burke, Cohen, & Doveh, 2014). This measure was tested against six 
variables with the results displayed in Table 3. The inter-rater agreement score (Rwg (j) ) for all 
variables ranged from 0.88 to 0.91, which reveals high agreement among raters with the 
exception of the regulator focus prevention variable that had an inter-rater score of 0.65. This 
result falls short of the accepted level of 0.70 (MacCormick & Parker, 2010).  
Inter-group homogeneity was tested using ICC (1), which indicates variance of the 
individual rater response when considered as part of a team (Chen et al., 2002). Generally the 
ICC (1) score ranged from 0 to 1; as the ICC converges on 1, the stronger the agreement between 
the raters. ICC (2) indicates that groups can be reliably differentiated (Bliese, 2000). Only the 
Active variable was over the suggested 0.70 good reliability level, and all other variables were 
below the cut-off values of 0.60 and 0.70 (Bliese, Halverson, & Schriesheim, 2002). Goncalo et 
al. (2010) suggested and followed previous research stating an acceptable cut-off of 0.20 for ICC 
(1).  
Heterogeneity can be confirmed with a significant F as it helps describe the difference 
across CCD (dyad) between CCD variance and within the dyad. Table 4 shows the results 
confirming dyad heterogeneity between all measures with the exception of prevention. ANOVA 
F value of 1 must be exceeded to accomplish heterogeneity (Gibson, 1999).  
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Table 4  
 Inter-rater Agreement and Reliability 
  Rwg(J) uniform         
  Mean SD F ratio p-value ICC (1) ICC (2) 
Efficacy 0.91 0.12 1.48 0.096 0.19 0.33 
Prevention 0.65 0.38 0.98 0.533 -0.01 -0.03 
Promotion 0.88 0.21 2.30 0.003 0.40 0.57 
Active 0.88 0.17 3.77 0.000 0.58 0.73 
Sit-and-
Wait 0.90 0.20 2.23 0.004 0.38 0.55 
Sit-and-
Pursue 0.91 0.11 1.41 0.128 0.17 0.29 
 
Confirmation of the natural occurrence of the groups’ (dyad) was accomplished as these groups 
are set by roles in the companies and rated as such on the scales.  
Hypothesis Testing 
The underlying properties were determined, along with the completion of aggregating the 
data. The next step was to test the relationship hypothesized in previous chapters. Following is a 
review of Hypotheses 1 through 7, followed by a correlation matrix of the variables in Table 5. It 
is important to have a clear understanding of the data presented in that table as aggregated data, 
including the CFO Firm Performance qualifier.  
 Hypothesis 1: CCD Efficacy positively relates to Firm Performance. 
 Hypothesis 2: CCD Prevention Focus negatively relates to CCD Efficacy.  
 Hypothesis 3: CCD Promotion Focus positively relates to CCD Efficacy. 
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 Hypothesis 4: A Sit-and-Wait Funding Climate will positively impact the relationship 
between CCD Promotion Focus and CCD Efficacy, such that when a Sit-and-Wait 
Funding Climate is high, the relationship between CCD Promotion and CCD Efficacy 
will be more positive, as opposed to when it is low.  
 Hypothesis 5: An Active Funding Climate will impact the relationship between CCD 
Prevention Focus and CCD Efficacy positively, such that when an Active Funding 
Climate is high, the relationship between CCD Prevention and CCD Efficacy will be 
positive, as opposed to negative when Active is low. 
 Hypothesis 6: CCD Efficacy will mediate the moderated effect of Group Promotion 
Focus and Sit-and-Wait Funding Climate on Firm Performance.  
 Hypothesis 7: CCD Efficacy will mediate the moderated effect of Group Prevention 
Focus and Active Funding Climate on Firm Performance. 
 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics: Aggregated Data at Dyad Level, Grouped with Firm Performance (CFO) 
   Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Firm Performance 3.48 .459       
2 Efficacy 4.38 .351 .482**      
3 Prevention 2.91 .558 -.391* -.203     
4 Promotion 4.13 .486 .182 .623** -.192    
5 Active 2.93 .592 .148 .076 -.053 .073   
6 Sit-and-Wait 3.34 .616 -.042 .117 -.089 -.023 -.492**  
7 Sit-and-Pursue 2.64 .592 -.004 .076 .236 -.007 .018 .266 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).      
N=34  
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Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
CCD Efficacy positively relates to Firm Performance. To test this positive relationship 
between CCD Efficacy and Firm Performance, Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient 
(r) was utilized. The results of the test demonstrated a positive correlation between CCD Efficacy 
and Firm Performance with an r = 0.482, p < .01. Based on this analysis, Hypothesis 1 is 
supported; there does appear to be a significant positive relationship between CCD Efficacy and 
Firm Performance.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
CCD Prevention Focus negatively relates to CCD Efficacy. To test this relationship 
between CCD Prevention Focus and CCD Efficacy, Pearson Product-Moment Correlation 
Coefficient (r) was utilized. The results of the test demonstrated no significant correlation 
between CCD Prevention Focus and CCD Efficacy with an r = -0.203, p > .05. Based on this 
analysis, Hypothesis 2 is not supported; there does not appear to be a significant negative 
relationship between CCD Prevention Focus and CCD Efficacy.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3) 
CCD Promotion Focus positively relates to CCD Efficacy. To test this positive 
relationship between CCD Promotion Focus and CCD Efficacy, Pearson Product-Moment 
Correlation Coefficient (r) was utilized. The results of the test demonstrated a positive correlation 
between CCD Promotion Focus and CCD Efficacy with an r = 0.623, p < .01. Based on this 
analysis, Hypothesis 3 is supported; there does appear to be a significant positive relationship 
between CCD Promotion Focus and CCD Efficacy.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4) 
A Sit-and-Wait Funding Climate will positively impact the relationship between CCD 
Promotion Focus and CCD Efficacy such that when a Sit-and-Wait Funding Climate is high, the 
relationship between CCD Promotion and CCD Efficacy will be more positive, as opposed to 
49 
 
when it is low. To test the moderation effect of Sit-and-Wait on the positive relationship between 
CCD Promotion Focus and CCD Efficacy, I utilized SSPS and the Process tool developed 
by  Hayes. The moderation model did not show a significant moderation, as can be seen in Table 
6 interaction data. 
Table 6 
Moderation Results for Sit-and-Wait: CCD Promotion Relationship with CCD Efficacy 
  coeff se t p R2 
 CCD Efficacy           
Interaction .1443 .1244 1.160 .2551   
 Sit-and-Wait .0860 .0671 1.282 .2096   
Promotion .4796 .1005 4.772 .0000 .4214 
 
The conditional effects of the predictor on the outcome are displayed in Table 7 and 
depicted in Figure 4. The results shown in Table 7 validate that when a Sit-and-Wait Funding 
Climate is high, the indirect effects of CCD Efficacy increase (p=<.01) and are significant. Even 
at a lower level of Sit-and-Wait funding via CCD Promotion Focus, there is an increase to CCD 
Efficacy that remains significant.  
 
Table 7 
Conditional Indirect Effects of CCD Promotion Focus on CCD Efficacy With  
Sit-and-Wait Funding Climate as a Moderator 
 Sit-and-Wait  Conditional se t p 
Indirect Effect 
Level 
 
      
Low .3906 .0916 4.266 .0002 
High .5685 .1535 3.703 .0009 
     
Note.  Low = -1 standard deviation; High = +1 standard deviation 
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Figure 4. Interaction of Sit-and-Wait and CCD Promotion Regulatory Focus  
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5) 
An Active Funding Climate will impact the relationship between CCD Prevention Focus 
and CCD Efficacy positively such that when an Active Funding Climate is high, the relationship 
between CCD Prevention and CCD Efficacy will be positive, as opposed to negative when Active 
is low. To test the moderation effect of an Active Funding Climate on the predicted negative 
relationship between CCD Prevention and CCD Efficacy, SSPS and the Process tool developed 
by  Hayes were utilized. The moderation model did not show a significant moderation, as can be 
seen in Table 8 interaction data. 
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Table 8 
Moderation Results for Active CCD Prevention Relationship with CCD Efficacy 
  coeff se t p R2 
CCD Efficacy           
Interaction -.0580 .2095 -.2766 .7840   
Active .0148 .0883 .1678 .8678   
Prevention -.1397 .2095 -.2766 .7840 .0508 
 
 
The conditional effects of the predictor on the outcome are displayed in the Table 9. The 
effect CCD Prevention has on CCD Efficacy has no significant effect across the continuum of 
Active Funding Climate.  
 
Table 9 
Conditional Indirect Effects of CCD Prevention Focus on CCD Efficacy with  
Active Funding Climate as a Moderator. 
 Active Conditional SE t p 
Indirect Effect 
Level         
Low -.0878 .1620 -.5420 .5918 
High -.1916 -3472 -.5518 .5852 
     
Note. Low = -1 standard deviation; High = +1 standard deviation 
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Figure 5. Interaction of Active and CCD Prevention Regulatory Focus  
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6) 
CCD Efficacy will mediate the moderated effect of Group Promotion Focus and Sit-and-
Wait Funding Climate on Firm Performance. To test the moderation-mediation, SSPS and the 
Process tool, model 7 developed by  Hayes, were utilized. The moderated-mediation model did 
not show any significant interaction as per Table 10.  
Table 10 
Results of Moderated-Mediated Regression of Sit-and-Wait Funding Climate on Firm 
Performance, CCD Promotion Focus via CCD Efficacy 
  coeff se t p R2 
Firm 
Performance           
Interaction .1443 .1244 1.160 .2551   
Sit-and-Wait 0860 0671 1.282 .2096   
Promotion .4796 .1005 4.772 .0000 .4214 
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Hypothesis 7 (H7) 
CCD Efficacy will mediate the moderated effect of Group Prevention Focus and Active 
Funding Climate on Firm Performance. To test the moderation-mediation, SSPS and the Process 
tool, model 7 developed by  Hayes, were utilized. The moderated-mediation model did not show 
any significant interaction as per Table 10.  
Table 11 
Results of Moderated-Mediated Regression of Active Funding Climate on Firm Performance, 
CCD Prevention Focus via CCD Efficacy 
  coeff se t p R2 
Firm 
Performance           
Interaction -.0580 .2095 -.2766 .7840   
Active .0148 .0883 .1678 .8678   
Prevention -.1397 1.087 -1.857 .4802 .0508 
 
Summary of Results 
Hypotheses 1 and 3 were supported with p = <0.001, confirming that a significant 
positive relationship is present at a collective level between CCD Efficacy and Firm Performance 
and CCD Promotion Focus and CCD Efficacy. Hypotheses 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 were supported; there 
was a conditional effect worth reporting. The effect CCD Promotion has on CCD Efficacy 
increases as the level of Sit-and-Wait increases. No interaction between any of the hypotheses 
modeled for moderation or the moderated-mediation.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This dissertation contends that group efficacy mediates the relationships between 
regulatory foci of promotion and prevention on Firm Performance. Furthermore, and most 
importantly, Funding Climate operates as a key contextual influence on the mediated paths from 
promotion and prevention of Firm Performance via group efficacy. This moderated-mediated 
model will help identify a more optimal fit between a firm’s focus and the funding style of a 
funding agency, ideally resulting in more venture success through Firm Performance and fewer 
failed funding transitions. The aggregation of the data between the top two “operational” 
executives created the dyad of interest referred to as the CCD throughout this research. A 
significant piece of this research was that the independent variable was truly that, independent in 
nature. To accomplish this, Firm Performance was not self-reported from a dyad perspective. The 
top finance person (CFO) of the organization rated the company’s performance and was matched 
with the dyad to complete the sample set on which the model was developed. In this chapter, the 
results of the analysis are reviewed, and the possible theoretical and practical implications are 
contemplated. The final section will also address limitations of this study and opportunities for 
future research.  
Interpretation of Results 
 The results of this research have accomplished significant validation of the theoretical
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model. Firm Performance was rated outside the CCD following the scale proposed by Wallace et 
al. (2010), which suggests that the scale may incorporate three types of performance: (a) financial 
performance (e.g., return on assets, return on sales, sales growth, and overall financial 
performance), (b) stakeholder performance (e.g., stability/growth of employment, employee 
morale/job satisfaction, customer relations, supplier relations, and overall nonfinancial 
performance), and (c) heterogeneity with regard to resource allocation strategies (e.g., funds 
allocated to R&D, funds allocated to advertising, process innovation, product innovation, and 
compensation to employees). Firm Performance stood to the scrutiny of internal consistency, 
leading the researcher to believe the scale truly measured the performance of the company. This 
scale was tested both on the overall sample and the reduced sample that was used in the 
hypotheses’ testing. The significant relationship between CCD Efficacy and Firm Performance 
intuitively makes sense: If the top management team believes in their combined strengths, they 
increase the chance of better performance throughout the entire company. The second piece, and 
the mediator in the model CCD Efficacy scale, was tested for internal consistency with decent 
results. That moved testing to the aggregation level where CCD Efficacy achieved good inter-
rater agreement.  
Significant research has been compiled on Group Regulatory focus; however, I was not 
able to find much research specific to the top two leaders of the company in the presence of a 
Funding Climate. This research suggested that a relationship between promotion-focused dyads 
and CCD Efficacy would be positive. As stated above, that was confirmed and found to be 
significant. The promotion focus scale items had reasonable internal consistency, and once 
aggregated, confirmed the difference between group differentiation and intra-group agreement. 
The validation of CCD Promotion Focus lends to the overall strength of this model. The 
dynamics in which the CCD works do not allow for perfectly structured and uniformed events. 
Lanaj et al. (2012) found that employees with a promotion focus, when confronted with 
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unexpected challenges and adversities in the workplace, had positive feelings and greater self-
esteem and self-efficacy, which seems to hold true in the case of a promotion-focused CCD.  
Prevention-focused items were tested at an individual level before moving on to the 
aggregation step; the scale scored reasonably for internal consistency. Once the aggregation 
process was complete, the results were very weak and not acceptable for intra-rater agreement, 
lacking overall reliability. Not surprisingly, no support occurred for a relationship between CCD 
prevention and CCD Efficacy. These results do not stray from other research dealing with 
prevention-focused scales. Interestingly, there was a significant nonhypothesized negative 
relationship between CCD prevention focus and Firm Performance. Nevertheless, with the 
suspect scale, these results hold little value.  
To review, Funding Climate is a “new” construct and is defined as the collective 
perception of the funding agency by CCD. Each funding agency functions distinctly in its 
investment strategy and the value it holds in the current CCD (management as a whole in some 
cases). Funding agencies are known to use a “gut feeling” approach when making decisions on 
investing in the funding opportunity (Chen et al., 2009). The Funding Climate scale was 
comprised of nine Sit-and-Wait items, eight Sit-and-Pursue, and five Active. The internal 
consistency of these items was acceptable, and a CFA was conducted with 178 observations and 
three items loading on three distinct factors. The new scale was tested for internal consistency 
with all three factors improving their (α). The new scale consisted of Sit-and-Wait, Sit-and-
Pursue, and Active having three items each. Testing for the moderating effect of Sit-and-Wait on 
the relationship between CCD promotion and CCD Efficacy was completed but showed no direct 
interaction. However, a significant result in the conditional indirect effects displayed that when 
Sit-and-Wait is high, the indirect effect on the relationship between CCD Promotion Focus  and 
CCD Efficacy is significant and positive. Even at lower levels, Sit-and-Wait has a positive,  
significant effect on the relationship between CCD Promotion Focus and CCD Efficacy. The test 
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was run to determine Hypothesis 5, and testing for the moderating effect active on the 
relationship between CCD prevention and CCD Efficacy showed no direct interaction. No 
significant results were found in the conditional indirect effects.  
The results of Moderated-Mediated Regression of Sit-and-Wait Funding Climate on Firm 
Performance and CCD Promotion Focus via CCD Efficacy and results of Moderated-Mediated 
Regression of Active Funding Climate on Firm Performance, CCD Prevention Focus via CCD 
Efficacy, proved insignificant. 
Theoretical Implications 
 The theoretical model designed by the hypotheses accomplished the goal of filling a gap 
in knowledge by confirming that a presence of a Funding Climate within the significant 
relationships between CCD promotion foci and CCD Efficacy and Firm Performance exists. A 
second considerable achievement of my research is the indirect effect that Sit-and-Wait Funding 
Climate has on the CCD promotion foci and CCD Efficacy at high levels, coupled by a positive 
effect even at low levels. The results of this dissertation add to literature and theory in business, 
climate, and ecology to a slighter degree.  
This dissertation partially answers the call by Richard, Devinney, Yip, and Johnson, 
(2009) by addressing the type of scale used to rate performance within an organization. In the 
future, more attention must be focused on aligning the measures of the scale to reflect the actual 
measures organizations use to measure overall performance internally. The scale utilized may 
meet their call as it crosses most internal measures of performance and is generalizable. The scale 
can be found in Appendix A. Further, Goyal, Rahman, and Kazmi (2013) left little doubt that 
Firm Performance may not only be about financial performance and should contain nonfinancial 
measures to achieve a reasonable amount of generalization.  
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Business scholars have emphasized the important role of decision-making in improving 
Firm Performance. Prior research has proposed that poor decision-making stems from failure of 
the top management team to operate collaboratively in a coherent manner (Carmeli et al., 2008). 
The significant positive relationship between CCD Efficacy and Firm Performance offers 
scholarly support that high levels of collective efficacy may produce increased performance. 
Lewis (2011) reflected that high levels of collective efficacy resulted in exposure to positive 
outcomes. Cooper, Nieberding, and Wanek, (2013) confirmed the importance of collaboration 
and teamwork of the executive level leadership team, indicating that it may helpful if the team 
shares personality traits, along with sharing a consistent style in goal accomplishment.  
This dissertation may add to the business literature when considering recruitment of an 
executive team. The significant results of a positive relationship from CCD promotion to CCD 
Efficacy may be added to the list of positive effects a properly aligned dyad produces. Gilmore 
and Turner (2010) met the need to modify the selection process by including more structure and 
behavioral components.  
Further, this dissertation contributes to social-cognitive theory, providing evidence that 
efficacy assessment across company roles is linked and collective efficacy may predicate group 
performance. Firm Performance could, in this setting, be considered group performance, opening 
a new avenue of research, the basis of which is my interpretation that top management team 
performance tracks parallel to the description of Firm Performance. Additionally, business 
scholars may take this opportunity to extend research to the next level of management (followers) 
to expand the breadth of knowledge and latent variables that affect Firm Performance. Hoyt et 
al.’s (2003) research confirmed that followers’ collective efficacy may be directly influenced by 
leadership’s collective efficacy.  
59 
 
The positive significant relationship between CCD promotion foci and the nonexistent 
CCD prevention foci with CCD Efficacy may lend to the literature in the sense that promotion 
foci in top management teams can be aggregated and generalizable. The same cannot be said 
about CCD prevention foci, which did not withstand the rigor of testing and failed to be 
supported by inter-rater agreement. This, however, confirms the need for more scholarly work 
towards a deeper understanding of the prevention scale. Interestingly, there seem to be 
nonpredicted, negative, and significant direct relationships to Firm Performance.  
This dissertation based the structure and tests of the Funding Climate on the ecology 
theory. Based on the tenets of behavioral ecology of predator-forging behavior, a Funding 
Climate can be identified as: (a) Active, (b) Sit-and-Pursue, and (c) Sit-and-Wait (Barbosa & 
Castellanos, 2005). Active funding agencies (i.e., Sharks) may demonstrate attributes such as 
aggressively pursuing, investigating, and analyzing new venture opportunities to fund moving 
across the industry, and they are risk takers. Sit-and-Pursue funding agencies (i.e., Hawks) tend to 
passively observe funding opportunities and actively engage when an appropriate investment 
arises; they are slower to move out of one sector but will as deal flows slow. Finally, Sit-and-
Wait funding agencies (i.e., Crocodiles) passively observe funding opportunities and wait for a 
new venture that meets specific requirements to fully present itself. They tend to wait for the right 
deal and have the staying power to do so while still being successful. The results of this 
dissertation contribute and confirm that funding agencies can scientifically be grouped in this 
space. This contribution not only adds to the literature, it may possibly open a new avenue for 
research utilizing the Funding Climate scale. 
Additionally, and possibly more importantly, with the validation of a Funding Climate, 
researchers may consider the opportunity to join a “new” conversation in the climate dimension. 
A plausible start to developing this construct begins with the conditional indirect effects the Sit-
and-Wait climate had on the CCD promotion foci relationship with CCD Efficacy confirmed in 
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this research. Climate can be defined as the collective perception of the work atmosphere is a key 
factor in an organization gaining a competitive advantage. Organizational climate can be defined 
as: “an experientially-based description of what people see and report happening to them in an 
organizational situation” (Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003, p. 644). Organization climate is 
reflective of the shared belief among the CCD, bringing relevance to the organizational 
environment in reference to what is important, anticipated, and rewarded through practices, 
guidelines, processes, routines and remuneration (Ostroff et al., 2003). There is sufficient 
research to support the notion that workplace climate can positively influence job performance 
(King et al., 2007). Research in the area of climate has been able to discriminate between good 
and bad work environments, high- and low-performing work teams, and the perceived level of 
support (Isaksen & Ekvall, 2010). Climate dimensions (e.g., safety, service, innovation, and 
involvement) have shown positive relationships to a number of outcome variables, including 
higher sales volume, market share, productivity, and profitability, reporting a greater impact from 
implementing new social and technical systems and improved ability to implement more complex 
work design (Kuenzi & Schminke, 2009) consistent with Firm Performance measures. This 
dissertation contributes to and confirms that Funding Climate may very well be a factor in Firm 
Performance.  
Implications for Practice 
An intended contribution of this dissertation was to offer scholars the opportunity to 
extend their breadth of knowledge concerning the top management team and introduce Funding 
Climate to an advanced audience with knowledge-backed results. Furthermore, this research may 
be beneficial to all executives and funding agencies. The current supported hypotheses in this 
dissertation offer top management teams vital information when considering a funding agent. 
With the confirmation of a valid scale for Funding Climate, an executive may be closer to having 
a deeper understanding of the traits of the funding agency, and more importantly, what they 
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consider important in the companies they will fund. Even if the top management team does not 
have full control of the decision, they will still possess the opportunity to further their 
understanding of delivery results by self-assessment of their CCD Efficacy levels. The business 
environment surrounding CCD can create significant task demands, increasing the need to split 
tasks; situations and industries that are exceedingly dynamic may induce the demand for a COO, 
allowing for the CEO to focus on external issues (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). Considering the 
positive significant relationship between CCD and performance, the top management team can be 
confident they may overcome tough decisions and issues with a higher efficacy level. These 
complications may induce urgency and create a demand for an increased level of diligence to 
fully understand CCD cogitation and interaction during a funding event. The indirect conditional 
effect seen with Sit-and-Wait Funding Climate, CCD promotion foci, and CCD Efficacy starts the 
conversation for understanding the effect during a funding cycle.  
Both top management teams and capital have diverse impact on organizations. Capital 
can be considered as economic growth stimuli that led the United States out of one economic 
slump after another (Narayan & Narayan, 2013; Solow, 2004). When an organization is a startup 
in the refinance phase or likely to be sold (change of control), the requirement for capital is 
inescapable. When a company approaches this threshold and capital is required, it will trigger a 
funding event, and the organization’s unique situation will determine the type of funding agency 
to be used. Perhaps more significant than the capital itself is the fit between the funding agency 
(holder of the capital) and the CCD, as it will have to manage Firm Performance emerging out of 
this fit. This dissertation may lend a hand in preparing top management teams for their funding 
event.  
 On the funder side of the equation, this dissertation opens a window into the complexity 
of a top management team. The funding agency that correctly identifies their internal Funding 
Climate may lead to a knowledge-based decision on the type of dyad they are looking for or may 
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want to place. Relevance in the area of recruitment becomes evident when considering the 
measures of CCD regulatory foci. The seemingly obvious choice of having a promotion bias may 
offer the funder a starting point on assessing the candidates for the position. I would caution 
against eliminating the prevention foci, as the lack of significance of the prevention scale may 
have been motivated by the scale itself, as seen in the results section.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 Conclusions drawn from this dissertation should be considered in light of limitations to 
the research. One limitation was the confirmation of a generalizable model. The subjects were 
small to large public companies from four countries, two of which are culturally diverse in 
comparison to the USA and Canada. The time since the funding event varied, as did the type of 
funding. This was a control variable, and consideration of the raters’ understanding of type of 
funding is an assumption left open as to the level of their knowledge in finance.  
 Narrowing Funding Climate to three items in each scale (Sit-and-Wait, Sit-and-Pursue, 
and Active) may be seen as a limitation, as one of each of the items scores lower than some 
believe is acceptable (.50 – one item in each was .45 with the other two over .85). The sample 
size (lack of power) that the CFA was run on was limited to 178 observations; however, the 
model cut off criteria was achieved, as discussed in the results section.  
 A major limitation to the research was the lack of statistical significance for aggregation 
of CCD prevention foci. No inter-rater agreement was achieved. Many reasons can be postulated 
as to causes of this limitation. With this knowledge, a researcher can work toward reviewing the 
scale and consider the top management team’s mindset during a funding cycle.  
 There are more limitations than stated above, and limitations bring opportunity for future 
research in the expansion and development of the Funding Climate construct and when it applies. 
63 
 
I contest that there is a “funding event” every year inside most companies that have divisions and 
must compete for capital at budget time.  
 A second avenue of future research is to consider when the funding agency becomes the 
prey and requires funding. Depending on the fund structure as private equity companies grow, 
they may receive institutional money. I hypothesize that their behavior and approach to investing 
will be somewhat regulated by what is now their funder. A second addition to a possible shift in 
behavior for the funder is that as they become fully invested, they may leave only the perfect 
investment (i.e., transitioning from Active to Sit-and-Wait).  
Conclusion 
Catalysts for creating value in an organization have been postulated to be competitors, 
ownership structure (public versus private), technology, management team, and a host of other 
variables that can be attributed to performance and success (Payne et al., 2009). There are, 
however, two variables that appear to be required to solidify any value horizon—capital and a 
functional top management team. These are core for most organizations, and without either of 
them, the organization may struggle in sustaining value. This dissertation set out to contend that 
group efficacy mediates the relationships between regulatory foci of promotion and prevention on 
Firm Performance and that Funding Climate operates as a key contextual influence on the 
mediated paths from promotion and prevention of Firm Performance via group efficacy. 
Although the research did not prove significant in all hypotheses, it has introduced the valid 
concept of “Funding Climate” and added to the literature for top management teams, mainly 
dyads, and aggregation within CCD promotion foci, CCD Efficacy, and their shared perspective 
of a Funding Climate. 
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APPENDIX A: FIRM PERFORMANCE ITEMS 
 
 
At the 
bottom of 
similar firms 
in the 
industry  
2  
In the middle, or 
on par, with 
similar firms in 
the industry  
4  
At the top 
of similar 
firms in 
the 
industry  
Funds allocated to R&D activities.            
Funds allocated to advertising.            
Return on assets.            
Return on sales.           
Sales growth.            
Overall financial performance.            
Stability/growth of employment.            
Process Innovations.            
Product Innovation.            
Compensation of employees.            
Employee morale/job satisfaction.            
Customer relations.            
Supplier relations.            
Overall NON-financial performance.           
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Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree 
The company has been able to stay 
within the covenants of the 
funding structure/terms.  
          
We have been fairly compensated 
from the funding source.  
          
We are satisfied with the funding 
source. 
          
We, as the management team, have 
had to adapt to the style of the 
funding source.  
          
The funding source has allowed 
the company to sustain growth.  
          
The funding source has enabled 
the company to sustain 
profitability.  
          
 
 0%  
0% to 
3%  
3% to 
5%  
5% to 
10%  
>10%  
Research and Development            
Advertisement, Promotion, Marketing            
Process Improvement            
Product Innovation            
Customer Relations            
Supplier Relations            
Employee and Leader Development            
 
1. If available, please provide your NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) 
Code: 
2. If available, please provide your SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) code: 
3. What was your company’s total sale last year? 
4. Please indicate your growth in employees over the past 12 months: 
5. What Business Sector/Industry are you in? 
6. Please indicate your growth in assets and/or inventory over the past 12 months: 
7. What was your company's gross income & net income?
82 
 
 
CCD Collective Efficacy 
 
Strongly 
Disagree (1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
(3) 
Agree (4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
We feel confident in our ability to perform well on our jobs.           
We think that we can launch or create a successful company.            
We feel that we are as capable of performing as well as 
other businesses in our field.  
          
On average, other businesses are probably not as capable of 
doing as well as we can.  
          
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CCD Group Regulatory Focus 
 
Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
In general, we are focused on preventing negative events at work as opposed 
to achieving positive outcomes.  
          
We are more oriented toward preventing losses than we are toward achieving 
gains.  
          
Our major goal right now is to achieve our business ambitions.            
Our major goal right now is to avoid becoming a business failure.            
We see ourselves as a business that is primarily striving to reach our "ideal 
self" -- to fulfill our hopes, wishes, and aspirations.  
          
We see ourselves as a business that is primarily striving to become the 
business we "ought to be" -- to fulfill our duties, responsibilities, and 
obligations.  
          
In general, we are focused on achieving positive outcomes as opposed to 
preventing negative outcomes.  
          
Overall, we are more oriented toward achieving success than preventing 
failure.  
          
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Funding Climate 
 
Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Neither  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
Our funding source has a 
thoughtful yet passive 
approach.   
          
Our funding source is 
reserved.  
          
Our funding source is 
conservative.  
          
Our funding source is patient.            
Our funding source is 
cautious.  
          
Our funding source spent a 
long time to decide whether 
or not to give us funding.  
          
Our funding source was 
looking only for the right 
opportunity. 
          
Our funding source spent time 
studying our business before 
deciding to work with us.  
          
Our funding source required 
considerable amount of “hand 
holding” before funding us.  
          
Our funding source was 
reluctant to fund our venture 
and needed convincing.  
          
Our funding source continues 
with a passive approach to 
funding.  
          
Our funding source was 
initially passive, but quickly 
turned into an aggressive 
investor. 
          
Our funding source was 
patient at first, but then 
became aggressive after 
seeing our business plan. 
          
After approaching our funding 
source, they were very active 
in funding process.  
          
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Our funding source switched 
from passive to active after 
initially meeting with us.  
          
Our funding source requires 
us to compete to win their 
business.   
          
Our funding source waited to 
be approached by us.   
          
Our funding source continues 
to actively pursue other 
businesses in our industry. 
          
Our funding source is 
aggressive.  
          
Our funding source frequently 
contacts us.   
          
Our funding source 
approached us first.  
          
Our funding source pursued 
us.   
          
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APPENDIX B: PILOT STUDY 
Introduction 
 One intention of this dissertation is to advance the understanding of climate, in particular, 
Funding Climate.  Another goal is to gain breadth on the understanding of funding climate 
operating as a key contextual influencer on firm performance. Additional validation of the CEO-
COO Dyad’s (CCD) shared view of their funding agency will be accomplished by employing a 
phenomenological approach.   Phenomenological study of funding climate describes top 
managements (CCD) experience during the funding cycle (phenomenon). Fundamentally, the 
initiative of phenomenology is to condense the experiences of an individual of a phenomenon to a 
common core description (Creswell, 2006).  
The funding event (cycle) is hypothesized to create a unique climate under which the 
CCD and funding agency impact.  This climate may commence or elevate when an organization 
requires external funding.  As a company approaches this threshold and capital is required, it will 
trigger a funding event, and the organization’s unique situation will determine the type of funding 
agency to be used. Perhaps more significant than the capital itself is the interaction between the 
funding agency (holder of the capital) and the CCD. This interaction may be exposed additionally 
through the in-depth interview process of this phenomenological study.  
This portion of this dissertation will attempt to answer the following questions: do the 
individuals interviewed confirm the existence of a climate created during the funding cycle.  Does 
the CCD have a shared view of the funding agency and can it be described in the context of an 
ecology-based taxonomy, consideration to the perspective that the behaviors and styles of the 
CCD may be viewed as antecedents or triggers of climate.   
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 Review of Literature 
 In this section, I review the core constructs of this phenomenological study: Funding 
Climate, Phenomenological research and Behavioral Ecology and Foraging Theory. They are 
reviewed at an organization level staying within the business dominion. I begin with Funding 
Climate and Ecology theory, is mainly exerts from the quantitative portion of my dissertation. 
Contemplating the vast differences in funding climate and the effect it will have on the CCD 
create an opportunity to align (fit) these two groups, elevating the possibility to generate 
additional value for the company. 
Funding Climate  
The literature on funding climate is very sparse to non-existent. Wallace et al. (2013) 
defined funding climate as the collective perception that the leadership team of an organization 
has of the funding agency.  
To gain an increased perspective of funding climate a review of the funding agency is 
needed.  In general terms, funding agencies include most types of nonpublic funding agencies. A 
second distinction of a funding agency is that the funds generally are equity capital. The capital 
comes from sponsors, investors and funds that are usually used invested directly into private 
companies achieving majority equity share and control of the company. Funding agencies, in 
general, are not listed nor invest in a stock exchange (public markets) and their function is to 
inject capital with the sole purpose of expansion of businesses or business idea, requiring a 
majority share in the form of equity (James, 2010).  Further, once the private equity acquires the 
company it may get involved more with the CCD. Private equity can take on many forms; angel 
investor (high-networth individuals), early stage venture capital, late-stage venture capital and, 
buyouts (Cendrowski & Wadecki, 2012).  A funding agency operates with a set procedure 
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depending on the cycle and the environment they are in; these procedures dictate how they react 
to venture opportunities.  
Climate is not new, researchers have been defining organizational climate since the 
1930s.  Hawthorne pioneered the human-relations movement turning researchers’ attention to the   
psychological environment within organizations. Climate can be partitioned into two forms: 
foundation and specific; “Foundation” or overall climate embodies a larger shared perspective of 
an environment, and “Specific” as the word suggests encompasses a specific area of interest 
(safety, service, etc.; Wallace & Chen, 2006). This research is foundational, due to the shared 
nature of the organizational climate.  
Although many contextual variables have been identified as influencing business success, 
many scholars stress the importance of climate (Amabile, Contu, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 
1996).  Climate, the collective perception of the work atmosphere is a key factor in the 
organization gaining a competitive advantage. Organizational climate can be defined as: 
“experientially based description of what people see and report happening to them in an 
organizational situation” (Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003, p. 644).  Organization climate is 
reflective of the shared belief among the CCD, bringing relevance to the organizational 
environment in reference to what is important, anticipated and, rewarded through practices and 
guidelines, processes, routines and remuneration (Ostroff, et al., 2003). 
Towards Funding Climate  
Theories from ecology have made their way into various business applications to provide 
a better understanding of the business behavior.  The Lotka-Volterra biological predator-prey 
model has been used by venture capital investors to help explain puzzling cycles similar to those 
seen in wildlife population (Brander and de Bettignies, 2009).  Predator-prey behavior has also 
been used in economic research in understanding oil prices and impact on the economy, copyright 
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piracy, investing behavior and consumer behavior (Andreoli, 2011; Burd, 2010; Vazquez & Watt, 
2010; Wells, 2012).  It may be said that opportunities are subject to ordinary progress and are 
only affected by the actions of a predator; such is the case when a funding agency makes an 
investment, diminishing the pool of existing investment opportunities, therefore, predator-prey 
can be seen to contain a fractional justification of the investment behavioral cycle (Brander et al,, 
2009). Foraging theory can help understand human foraging behavior in both ancient and modern 
hunter-gatherer populations in anthropological settings studying human behavior (Wells, 2012).  
Foraging theory suggests the predator energy “uptake” is maximized utilizing a 
compromise between intake and cost which depend on distinct prey qualities such as size, attack 
response, handling time along with the atmospheric characteristics such as temperature and prey 
concentrations  (Shettleworth, Stephens, & Krebs 1988).  Foraging strategies are diverse and 
depend highly on the system to create decision rules.  Considering that a forger’s goal is to 
maximize energy “uptake”, the urgency for a forger that has a time constraint is much greater 
than of those who have a digestion limit. Naturally famine will escalate the incentive to consume 
as much and as fast as possible, where repletion will have a negative influence on motivation to 
search for and consume, hence significantly reducing attack rates and time spent on foraging, 
which will increase digestive pauses (Hohberg & Traunspurger,  2009).   
Behavioral ecology and foraging theory provide a framework for understanding strategic 
feeding and consumption behavior of animals including behaviors such as search, identification, 
procurement, handling, utilization, and digestion (Wells, 2012).  Studies in predator-prey 
interaction have shown predators can impact prey consumption through predator-induced 
alterations in foraging, habitat use, morphology and other consumptive and non-consumptive 
effects (Preisser, Orrock, & Schmitz, 2007).  
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 Predators can be classified into three broad categories: Active, Sit-and-Pursue, and Sit-
and-Wait (Barbosa & Castellanos, 2005). Active predators continually patrol for prey by moving 
through their environment to find and capture their prey. Sharks, shrews and jumping spiders are 
animals that demonstrate the characteristics of active predators.  Sit-and-pursue predators 
typically wait for their prey to approach before striking, either by ambushing or waiting for prey 
to come into close range to pounce.  This group may change its location upon depletion of prey in 
a particular area.  A hawk would be an example demonstrating this type of predatory behavior.  
The third type of predators are the sit-and-wait, they remain in one fixed location for extended 
periods waiting for the prey to pass by their location.  These predators do not change locations 
often, regardless of obtaining immediate prey or extended waiting. Crocodiles represent this type 
of behavior.  
To have a predator-prey state one of the two species must survive by preying on the 
other, as the prey is consumed, the population of the predators grows, it will continue to grow to a 
point in which the population of the prey is not sustainable and that of the predator will begin to 
diminish, leading to a recovery of the prey population followed by revitalization of the predator 
population, thus creating a cyclical behavior (Vazquez & Watt, 2010).  This creates a challenge 
when interviewing the CCD, as the perception of being prey may arouse a reactionary response. 
Applying predator-prey theory to funding agencies is the foundation of creating the 
funding climate taxonomy. Scale development was completed utilizing Hinkin’s (1998) 
guidelines. Wallace et al. (2013) frame the broad spectrum of funding agencies, utilizing a 
deductive approach to item generation. The scale has been validated by surveying CCD of small 
to mid-size companies that were involved in a funding event (i.e., acquired by or partially 
acquired with funding agencies funds).   
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Based on the tenets of behavioral ecology of predator forging behavior a funding climate 
can be identified as: (1) Active, (2) Sit-and-Pursue, and  (3) Sit-and-Wait (Barbosa, and 
Castellanos, 2005).  Active funding agencies (i.e. Sharks) may demonstrate attributes such as 
aggressively pursuing, investigating and analyzing new venture opportunities to fund moving 
across industry and are risk takers.  Sit-and-Pursue funding agencies (i.e. Hawks) tend to 
passively observe funding opportunities and actively engage when an appropriate investment 
arises, slower to move out of one sector but will as deal flows slows.  Finally, Sit-and-Wait 
funding agencies (i.e. Crocodiles) passively observe funding opportunities and wait for a new 
venture to fully present itself that meets its specific requirements, tend to wait for the right deal 
and have the staying power to do so and be successful.   
Phenomenology Research 
The meaning of the term ‘phenomenology’ can be said to be a presence of anything, 
which one is cognizant. “Anything at all, which appears to consciousness, is a legitimate area of 
philosophical investigation. One can characterize phenomenological philosophy as centering on 
the following basic themes: a return to the traditional tasks of philosophy, the search for a 
philosophy without presuppositions, the intentionality of consciousness, and the rejection of the 
subject–object dichotomy” (Roy, M., 2010).  In Heidegger’s terminology, phenomenology 
involves letting things ‘show themselves from themselves in the very way in which they show 
themselves from themselves’ (Roy, M., 2010).  
Phenomenology focuses on an individual’s personal experience; second, phenomenology 
is concerned in the facts mean. Either objective or subjective, with the assumption that cultural 
and individual aspect will be affecting the advancement of that meaning. Qualitative research 
methods assume that to gain a better understanding of individual experiences through exploiting 
numerous ways of knowing (Hoffman, 2011).  Phenomenological researcher are looking for 
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concreteness in the description of the phenomena that replicates the experienced situation rather 
than a hypotheses or prior inferences.     
Funding climate is based on the tenets of behavioral ecology of predator forging behavior 
making the use of Zaltman Metaphor Elicitation Technique (ZMET) an appropriate ancillary tool 
for delivering on a broader understanding of the individual experience through metaphors. 
Metaphors may also be reflections and behaviors; they can be mental images, with the majority 
being visual (Robin Higie Coulter and Gerald Zaltman, 1994).  Pictures of predators with varied 
levels of “hunting” aggression were shown to the CCD they were asked to describe their funding 
agency metaphorically by choosing one of the pictures.   Robin et al., (1994) add that pictures 
characterize individuals and items, and about the representation of individuals and items in 
pictures.  
Khoo-Lattimore,  Thyne, and Robertson, (2009) revealed ZMET has been a strong tool 
for inspiring raters to expose and debate the influences of their decisions on choosing a new 
home. The advantage of ZMET is that it allowing the individuals to use their own words.  Khoo-
Lattimore et al. (2009) explained how deep-rooted motives supporting their decision on home 
choice that may not have been empirically explored.  
 Methodology 
The respondents will be CEO or the top operational person in the firm; they will need to 
have a working knowledge of the business and ultimately the funding event. A second condition 
to consider is the length of time since the funding event, as the stage in the funding cycle may 
become a very important factor to consider in future work, and so this will be part of the 
interview.  To combat the possible stress of feeling hunted, the top manager will be to describe 
his traits first, utilizing the ZMET process in conjunction with laddering.  The sample size will be 
93 
 
between 8 and 16 respondents, this has been a the range from past research (Christensen & Olson, 
2002; Khoo-Lattimore et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2003; Sease, 2005; Vorell et al., 2003).  This 
section will review the steps taken in developing the hybrid in-depth interview including the 
phenomenological reduction and ZMET steps, and the oral and email script.  
Core Steps in Implementing ZMET  (Zaltman, 1997)  
1. Step 1 - Storytelling. Participant describes the content of each picture they have taken or 
brought. The interviewer refrains from interpreting pictures during interview.  – The 
conversation will be framed in the context of a funding cycle. Six pictures will be used: 
Box Jellyfish, Shark, Hawk, Fox, Tiger, and Crocodile.      
2. Step 2 - Missed Images. Participant describes the picture(s) that he/she was unable to 
obtain and explains their relevance. Missed pictures may have important relevance too. – 
This step will be modified. This interviewee does not or is not able to relate any of the 
pictures listed above with their funding agency, and so they will be offered to opportunity 
to suggest a different way to describe their funder metaphorically.   
3. Step 3 - Sorting Task. Participant sorts pictures into meaningful groups and provides a 
label or description for each pile. This action helps to establish themes or constructs that 
are relevant to the participant. -  For this step participants will describe in detail the 
climate surrounding funding cycle.  At this point an opportunity will be offered to 
elaborate whether the climate changed throughout the funding cycle.  
4. Step 4 - Construct Elicitation. A structured interview where basic constructs and their 
interconnections are elicited using images as stimuli. This involves a modified version of 
Kelly Repertory Grid technique and the laddering technique.  - Elicitation of constructs 
using triads of elements, I will present the three “constructs”: Active, Sit & Pursue, and  
Sit & Wait and ask for differences and similarities.  
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5. Step 5 - The Most Representative Picture. Participant indicates which picture is most 
representative and gives reasons for the choice. – The top manager will be asked which 
funding climate best represents his or her funding agency (if this detail had not already 
been offered in previous step.) 
6. Step 6 - Opposite Images. Descriptions are elicited of pictures that describe the opposite 
of the task. – Once the interviewee has committed to one of the pictures or has described 
an alternative metaphor, he or she will be asked to suggest the opposite of what they 
have chosen. 
7. Step 7 - Sensory Images. Descriptions are elicited of what does and does not describe the 
concept in terms of color, emotions, sound, smell, taste and touch. Sensory thoughts are 
images too and hence important to capture. – The interviewee will be asked about the 
emotions during the funding event..  
8. Step 8 - Mental Map. Participant creates a map or causal model using the constructs that 
have been elicited. – I will ask the interviewee to describe at what point he or she began 
to have confidence (trust) his or her funding agency.  
9. Step 9 - Summary Image. Participant creates a summary image or montage expressing 
the topic under study by using digital imaging. – Not applied. 
10.  Step 10 - Consensus Map. Researcher creates a map or causal model involving the most 
important constructs from the interview transcripts.  – See results section. 
Laddering is a way to gather in-depth information about the constructs and contrasts 
generated during the interview (Tan & Tung, 2003). Young et al. (2005) used laddering either 
to probe for more information regarding a construct and how it affects a stimulus or to 
confirm what the construct means to the participant. Laddering leads to more specific 
answers or clarification of something the participant said.  The process template for the 
interview included three steps: first, identifying with a predator (one of the 6 pictures or 
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other); second, asking for expansion on the interaction with the predator; third, asking about 
change in climate and the emotions they felt during the funding cycle.  
Script: Modified ZMET & Laddering (Actual) 
 Name of Funding agency 
 Time since funding event 
 Please describe a situation in which you had an interaction with your funding agency. 
 Six to pictures of predator animals will be given to the participant, followed by the 
interviewing asking which (if any) would best represent themselves 
 Six pictures of predator animals will be given to the participant, followed by the 
interviewing asking which (if any) would best represent their funding agency. 
o If none are chosen ask how they see they funder 
o Can you come up with any other way metaphorically to describe their behavior? 
o What animal would you see to be the opposite of your funder >>>> 
 If participant has acknowledged that their funder could be “represented” by one of the 
predator pictures I will ask for words to describe the construct… 
o What words would you use to describe your funders behavior 
o Active  - Sit & Pursue – Sit & Wait….. 
o If no relationship has been acknowledged, I will ask them to describe their funder 
in actions. 
 Did you experience change the habits or style of your funding agency during the funding 
cycle?   
o Place pictures out and see if they can order them on a time line – pre- during – 
post.   
o If they did not see a relationship to predators, ask them to describe change. 
 What type of emotions did you experience during the funding event? 
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 Can you step me through the process, at what point did begin to “trust” or gain 
confidence in your funding agency.  
 Close with thanking them for their time. 
Phenomenological Reduction Steps (Giorgi, 2009) 
In the first step, The researcher first reads the whole description in order to get a sense tf 
the whole. The phenomenological approach is holistic and so no further steps can be taken until 
the researcher has an understanding of what the data are like. In the second step, the researcher 
then goes back to the beginning of the description and begins to reread it. This time, every time 
she experiences a transition in meaning from within the aforementioned attitude, she makes a 
mark on the description. This is the process of constituting parts. Most descriptions are too long 
to be retained easily and so the constitution of parts helps in the analysis. These parts are called 
meaning units and they are arbitrary and carry no theoretical weight. They are correlated with the 
attitude of the researcher. It is assumed that different researchers will have different meaning 
units.  
For the third step, the researcher transforms the data, still basically in the words of the 
subject, into expressions that are more directly revelatory of the psychological import of what the 
subject said. In other words the psychological value of what the subject said is made explicit for 
the phenomenon being studied. The use of the method of free imaginative variation is critical for 
the completion of this step. Step three is the heart of the method. In Step 4, the direct and 
psychologically more sensitive expressions are then reviewed and with the help of free 
imaginative variation an essential structure of the experience is written. In the final step, the 
essential structure is then used to help clarify and interpret the raw data of the research. 
(Examples of the application of this method can be found in Giorgi, 1985, 2009; Giorgi & Giorgi, 
2003, 2008.) 
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Oral Consent Script (IRB Approved) 
The purpose of this interview is to gain an understanding of the relationship between you 
(“CEO”) and your funding agency (Bank etc.).  As the leader and innovator of your firm your 
insight of the funding agency will help fill a gap in knowledge of the climate created during (pre 
& post) funding.  Your participation in the interview process is 100% at will and you may decline 
to do the interview or stop the interview at any time during the interview. The interview should 
take approximately 30 minutes to complete.   I would like to request to record the interview for 
data quality purposes.  The data will be transcribed to a word document and encrypted to protect 
your confidentially, this data will be tested with a secure software (Nvivo).  The recording will be 
promptly destroyed.  There will be two people that will have access to the data, Dr. Craig Wallace 
and myself (Warren Dyer). This data will be used to validate funding climate.  All identifying 
characteristics, such as occupation, city, and ethnic background, will be changed.  
As stated previously:  I would like to record the interview and I ask for your oral 
permission to record the interview, keeping in mind that you may decline or stop the interview at 
any time 
I also mentioned that this data will be used in validating a funding climate and that your 
identity will remain confidential.  I ask fro your oral permission to use the data in this research 
effort.    
Email Script (IRB Approved) 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
We are researchers in the world’s first ever PhD for Business Executives at Oklahoma 
State University in the Watson Graduate School of Management. As a guiding member of this 
research group, I am reaching out to you because you have expressed interest in helping us 
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complete a groundbreaking research project.  
We are launching a new research project that should have immediate business 
implications for organizations seeking external funding to boost their organization’s performance 
(e.g., sales, income, etc). This project involves the perception of a funding agency by business 
leaders (i.e., business owners, entrepreneurs, etc) that have used external funding to help their 
business. We believe that this research will help uncover a new framework that will help match 
those seeking funding with the right type of funding agency. In other words, it will minimize the 
negative outcomes of going with the wrong type of funding agency.  
We are asking for your assistance in validating this framework. You are a leader and 
innovator in your field and we greatly value your insight (and that of your top management team). 
We need you, as the organization’s CEO, your COO (or employees in similar positions to this) 
participate in an in-depth interview, this interview can be accomplished in 30 minutes, due to the 
nature of our research we believe that much will be gained through an interview.   
Results 
The phenomena that I wish to describe is the perceived climate of the funding agency 
through the eyes of the CCD, to gain value this will have to be through lived experiences not 
opinions or hypotheses.  A deeper understanding of how the CCD views the funding agency may 
account for how the CCD reacts to task obligations, ultimately increasing or decreasing firm 
performance.  The participants for the in-depth interviews were part of the 50 plus company that 
participated in the surveys.  The modified ZMET interview was utilized as per the interview 
guide reviewed in the previous section.  In the following section we move closer to answering the 
questions set out in the introduction.  Did the individuals interviewed confirm the existence of a 
climate created during the funding cycle?  Does the CCD have a shared view of the funding 
agency and can it be described in the context of an ecology-based taxonomy? 
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The sample consisted of 18 individuals from 9 different companies, at the time of writing 
the results section, 7 dyads have been completely coded and are part of the analysis.  The additional 
two singles will be utilized where applicable.  The interviews have been completed and will be 
added to the sample, as dyads, once coding is complete.  The interviews were conducted in person 
and over the phone, 7 in person and 11 over the phone.   4 interviews were conducted prior to the 
rater taking the survey; the other 14 had already taken the survey.    
Table 1B shows the funding type, funder’s metaphoric predator (trait), self-rating of their 
metaphoric predator (trait) and elapsed time since the start of the funding event.  The company size 
and type are not in the table, they range from small to medium in size and all companies operate in 
the Oil & Gas industry.  Relevant from the table is the fairly significant number of dyads that shared 
opinion of their funders’ metaphorical predator with equity funding. 
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Table 1B 
Qualitative Dyad Sample Preliminary Results 
Dyad # Funding Type Funder’s Trait CCD Trait (Self) Elapsed Time 
Dyad 1.docx Equity Shark Tiger 6 months 
Dyad 1b.doc Equity Shark Fox 6 months 
Dyad 2.docx Equity Box Jellyfish Shark 9 months 
Dyad 2b.doc Equity Box Jellyfish Fox 9 months 
Dyad 3.doc Equity Shark Hawk 30 months 
Dyad 3b.doc    30 months 
Dyad 4.doc Angel Bunny Rabbit  Tiger 36 months 
Dyad 4b.doc    36 months 
Dyad 5.doc Equity Tiger Hawk 60 month 
Dyad 5b.doc Equity Chihuahua Fox 60 month 
Dyad 6.doc Angel Snake Hawk 54 months 
Dyad 6b.doc Angel Hawk Fox 54 months 
Dyad 7.doc Debit Crocodile Box Jellyfish On Going 
Dyad 7b.doc Debit Shark Bull On Going 
Dyad 8.doc Equity Shark Hawk 72 months 
Dyad 8b.doc Equity Shark Fox 72 months 
Dyad 9.docx Equity Hawk Fox 60 months 
Dyad 9b.docx Equity Hawk Hawk 60 months 
 
The interviews were in recorded in MP3 format, they were transcribed by a third party 
into a word document.  The word document (data) was loaded into two different qualitative 
software programs, NVivo (10.1.1 Mac) and Dedoose.  Data reduction was performed 
analogously to phenomenological reduction steps from the previous section. The data was coded 
into the following descriptors.  Funder Trait, this was the metaphoric predator that was assigned 
by the individual (CEO, COO, SVP, VP or Owner).  Funder Described is a sub-code for Funder 
Trait and was utilized as step two of the laddering process, searching for synonyms that describe 
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the Funder Trait.  Interaction was also coded, this related to the opening question on most cases, 
through out the interview if when the interviewee want to tell a story they were encouraged as per 
the principle idea of phenomenological approach. Change in Business, refers to the idea of the 
company or funders effect on how the business was operated (some of the interviewees referred 
to the change as culture). Great Quotes are simply that, quotes taken from the interviews that 
could not be reduced due to concerns of dilution of the story.  Dyad Trait is the self-reported 
metaphoric predator of the interviewee.   Change in Funder Trait, due to the time elapsed since 
the funding event a code was necessary to capture any change in the traits of the funder.  Trust in 
Funder, reflects the interviewee’s confidence and trust with their funding agency.  Emotions, 
indicates to the emotions that were felt throughout the funding cycle.  The final code is Opposite 
of Funder Trait, as the name implies it refers to the interviewee felt was the opposite to the 
metaphoric trait of the funder.  All depicted in Figure 1B, the larger the lettering, the richer in 
data. 
 
Figure 1B. Packed Code Cloud  
All the codes were weighted from 0 to 10 on unique criteria; Table 2 contains simple 
statistics of the weighted codes.  Change in Business was weighted on a scale of 0 to 10; a weight 
of 1 indicated that the company controlled the operations of the company, a weight of 5 indicated 
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they worked together each doing their part, and a weight of 10 meant the funder is influential in 
running the business.  Change in Funder Trait was scored on a scale of 0 to 10. Scoring a 0 on 
this scale suggested very little deviation from original trait, and scoring a 10 meant a complete 
face lift (e.g., Shark/Active to Crocodile/Sit & Wait). For Dyad Trait, a score closer 1 meant a 
Crocodile or a passive sit and wait predator, while a score closer to 10 indicated an active 
predator, such as a shark, tiger.  Emotions utilized the same scale with a score 5 or less indicating 
less of an emotional roller coaster, and anything above reflecting high emotions for the 
individual’s perspective.   Funder Trait mirrors the Dyad trait with the obvious distinction of 
being the point of view of the company leader.  Funder Described, scaled from 0 to 10, concurs 
with the Funder trait, inferring sit and wait climate at low values and an active funding climate at 
higher values.   Great Quotations were scored reflecting whether the overall statement was more 
or less tumultuous to the organization.  Interaction followed the 0 to 10 measure with weighting 
to the left of the scale lead interaction and to the right would signify a funder lead interaction. 
Opposite Funder Trait referred the extreme change and was weighted 0 for less change and 10 for 
complete change in funding climate attributes.  For Trust in Funder, a weight of 0 indicated low 
trust, and 10 identified with high trust. 
Table 2B 
Code Weighted Statistics Table 
 
 
Count Min Max Mean Median
Change	in	Business	 23 2 9 5.5 5
Change	in	Funder	Trait 19 2 9 4.2 3
Dyad	Trait 22 2 9 5.4 5
Emotions 13 1 9 6.8 7
Funder	Trait 37 1 9 5.5 5
	Funder	Described	 30 1 9 4.5 3.5
Great	Quotes 20 2 8 5.4 5
Interaction 26 2 8 5.7 7
Opposite	of	Funder	Trait	 6 2 10 4.7 3.5
Trust	in	Funder 19 1 9 4.7 5
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 The weighting system when applied to funding type as seen in Table 2B may be a decent 
over-all representation of all the high-level effects of funding type through the eyes of the 
company leaders.  The weighting system when applied to Funder Trait as seen in Figure 2B 
reflects the weighted score for all codes versus Funder Trait.  The graph is hard to read but may 
contain some of the most pertinent information.  However, to gain further understanding all the 
data need to be looked at holistically.   
 
Figure 2B. Code Weighted per Funder Trait by Descriptor 
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Figure 3B is a representation of the weighted score of Emotions and Interaction per 
Funder Trait.  The size of the dot is dictated by the number of time Funding Trait was coded. 
For example, the large blue dot top right is a Shark; 7.5 weighted trait, Emotion 8.3 weighted 
score, and Interaction weighted score of 6.5.   
 
Figure 3B. Code Weighted Description Bubble Plot 
 
Figure 4B, a code present table, indicates the fulfillment of all interviewees answering the 
question; further review will be done to fill in the absent codes.  
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Figure 4B. Code Present / Absent 
 
The great quotations identified in Table 3B hold a tremendous amount of power when 
considering the development of a climate in particular to thus study a funding climate, as it is 
build during the funding cycle.  
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Table 3B 
Great Quotations 
Quotation Is Weighted: True Weight 
Range: 0-10 
Default 
Weight: 
5 
I’m going to go with my original thought of a 
Chihuahua. 
Excerpt - Document: 
Dyad 5b.doc 
Position: 
2249-2306 
Weight: 
7 
Because they always wanted to talk and talk and 
bark and bark and bark about stuff. But at the 
end of the day, they really didn’t—I don’t think 
they added in too much. 
Excerpt - Document: 
Dyad 5b.doc 
Position: 
2368-2535 
Weight: 
7 
Right. Just kind of like a shark without teeth. Excerpt - Document: 
Dyad 5b.doc 
Position: 
2940-2987 
Weight: 
7 
Like Owls. They watch.  Excerpt - Document: 
Dyad 4.doc 
Position: 
5939-
5962, 
Weight: 
2 
And a little bit of a wolf in sheep’s clothing sort 
of, in a way. 
Excerpt - Document: 
Dyad 9.docx 
Position: 
2116-2182 
Weight: 
8 
He is very aggressive. He doesn't like to be 
questioned. I don't know if that's maybe an 
insecurity… 
Excerpt - Document: 
Dyad 1b.doc 
Position: 
5592-5693 
Weight: 
5 
I do think it's been difficult for him to transition 
to dealing with two maybe stronger women. 
Excerpt - Document: 
Dyad 1b.doc 
Position: 
6465-6559 
Weight: 
5 
I think trust might be yeah. I understand the animal, 
but I wouldn't say that I would trust him. 
Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 1b.doc 
Position: 
9588-9684 
Weight: 5 
No. They're going to bite you if it's going to benefit 
them.  
Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 1b.doc 
Position: 
9879-9941 
Weight: 5 
What word used in funding behavior—the boys? 
Positive—yeah, they were very positive on the 
funding at the time in regards to the funding idea of 
them putting it in. They were positive and were— 
Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 6b.doc 
Position: 
2404-2597 
Weight: 6 
(table 
continues) 
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Quotation Is Weighted: True Weight 
Range: 0-10 
Default 
Weight: 
5 
I would rather just go for the kill when it is time. Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 2.docx 
Position: 
2680-2732 
Weight: 5 
A crocodile sits there and kind of waits for 
something to come around. So they do strike when 
they are ready but it normally takes someone to drag 
them off their ledge.  
Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 2.docx 
Position: 
4550-4719 
Weight: 3 
I think in their minds they are more aggressive than 
they really are. 
Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 2b.doc 
Position: 
1269-1339 
Weight: 3 
Their short time frame may be five years. Ours may 
be five months. 
Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 2b.doc 
Position: 
1637-1703, 
Weight: 3 
As time, I am still confident. I am confident that 
they are who they are.  
Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 2b.doc 
Position: 
6880-6954 
Weight: 3 
Extremely smart, extremely clever so to me a shark 
is a very clever animal more than a tiger.  
Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 5.doc 
Position: 
3017-3111 
Weight: 7 
They don't do much, so they don't have to put out 
much energy, but they get lots in return.  
Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 7b.doc 
Position: 
2426-2518 
Weight: 4 
Aggressive, small when we first interacted with 
them, so I mean aggressive in terms of they had a lot 
of pressure probably. They had a lot to prove. 
Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 3.doc 
Position: 
2298-2448 
Weight: 8 
Frustration maybe. I would say uncertainty. 
Uncertainty, frustration…but you know at the end of 
the day, excitement I guess for both parties.  
Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 3.doc 
Position: 
4645-4787 
Weight: 7 
And it is just going wrong. It was a sort of surreal 
feeling of why isn’t anybody looking at this. 
Excerpt - 
Document: 
Dyad 9b.docx 
Position: 
2016-2114 
Weight: 7 
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Discussion 
This qualitative portion of my dissertation can be viewed as a pilot study and ancillary to 
my main quantitative research.  The questions that this study attempted to answer are  (a) Did the 
individuals interviewed confirm the existence of a climate created during the funding cycle?  (b) 
Does the CCD have a shared view of the funding agency and can it be described in the context of 
an ecology-based taxonomy?   
Climate, the collective perception of the work atmosphere is a key factor in the 
organization gaining a competitive advantage. Organizational climate can be defined as: 
“experientially based description of what people see and report happening to them in an 
organizational situation” (Ostroff et al., 2003, p. 644).   The interview process revealed that at the 
onset of a funding event, continuing through the funding cycle, the company experienced change 
in climate, through interaction, and business process that created emotions and actions / reactions 
to the funders’ leadership style and lack of or increased presents in their environment.  The 
second seems to be answered in Table 1B: 4 out of the 5 equity funded CCD agreed on the 
Funders Trait.   
There are limitations to this qualitative approach. The main limitation is it has only be 
been completed by one rater.  A second considerable limitation concerns that CCD suggested the 
funder’s metaphoric predator on their bases of the perspective of six pictures. For example, one of 
the interviewees explained why he felt a bank was a shark, he had seen a bank doing the least 
amount to gain the most, and he evaluated on his measure of energy expenditure.  With very 
limited statistical merit, this study will be considered a pilot study.  
To advance this research, more dyads would need to be added, along with recruitment of 
at least two other raters.  Additional questions may be added to the interview, such as a self-
assessment of whether the funding event was a success. 
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Pictures and Descriptions Used in In-Depth Modified ZMET Interview 
 
 
Foxes are very efficient predators and will kill large 
numbers of prey items (much more than they could 
possibly eat) if the food species or materials become 
available. Caching behavior is a very strong instinctive 
drive in foxes and is displayed even in captivity and 
even in habitats in which burial of the food materials 
are not possible. 
Sharks behavioral traits including stalking specific victims, 
lurk out of sight to observe their prey, hunting strategically 
and learning from previous attempts.  “Sharks could have 
waited where the seals congregated if they were random, 
opportunistic killers, but instead had a distinct mode of 
operation” 
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The box jellyfish actively hunts its prey and small fish), 
rather than drifting as do true jellyfish 
Crocodiles use a combination of active hunting and the more 
passive "sit and wait" strategy. 
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They are keen-eyed and efficient hunters, referring open 
areas, such as fields or deserts, with high perching places 
from which they can watch for prey.  These birds are 
adaptable and also do well in mountains and tropical rain 
forests.  
The tiger's hunting tactics are based on out-thinking the 
opponent with intelligence and cunning. The final blow 
is of course delivered with unadulterated brute force.  
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